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THE CASE FOR REBALANCING ANTITRUST
AND REGULATION
HowardA. Shelanski*
The Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko and Credit
Suisse v. Billing reduced the reach of antitrust law in regulated industries; they did so even where Congress expressly preserved
antitrust enforcement, and even though the Court itself had long
declined to block antitrust suits against regulatedfirms except in
unusual circumstances. This Article analyzes the reasoning and potential consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. It provides a
critique of the Supreme Court's redrawing of the relationship between antitrust and regulation and explains how Trinko and Credit
Suisse could saddle regulators with a choice between inefficiently
strong and overly weak regulation as economic conditions change
in regulated industries. The Article concludes that consumers and
industry would benefit from a rebalancing of antitrust and regulation and discusses several possible means to that end.
TABLE OF CONTENTS
........
.............................................
THE DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY IMMUNITY
................
FROM ANTITRUST LAW.....................

INTRODUCTION

1.

......
A. Antitrust and Regulation Before 2004............
1. Implied Immunity Without a Savings Clause ..............
2. Immunity and Statutes with an Antitrust
...............
......
Savings Clause......
...............
B. Antitrust and Regulation After 2004.......
.....
1. Verizon v. Trinko ....................
.....
................
2. Credit Suisse v. Billing
C. The Court's Underlying Rationale: Overemphasis on
......
.....................
Overenforcement?
1. Overemphasis on False Positives: Some Evidence .....
.....
2. Public Versus PrivateAntitrust Actions.....
II. Do TRINKO AND CREDIT SUISSE MAKE A DIFFERENCE? .. . .......

684
685
687
687
689
693
693
706
710
711
713
714

*
Deputy Director, Bureau of Economics, Federal Trade Commission; Professor of Law,
Georgetown University (on leave). This Article represents my personal views and not necessarily
those of the FTC. I am grateful to Jon Baker, Bill Bratton, Julie Cohen, Rob Davis, Einer
Elhauge, Bill Kovacic, Steve Salop, Catherine Sharkey, Phil Weiser, Kathy Zeiler, and workshop
participants at Emory University, Georgetown University, Northwestern University, and the University of Pennsylvania for helpful comments and suggestions.

683

Michigan Law Review

684

IVol. 109:683

III. CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BALANCE BETWEEN

718
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION ......................
.
.............. 719
A. The Costs and Benefits of Regulation
..... 720
.....................
1. PriceRegulation
..... 722
....................
2. Access Regulation
B.

Why Regulation Gets Harderas CompetitionDevelops ... 725

C. Antitrust as a Substitutefor Regulation....
IV.

........ 727

ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS TO BALANCING ANTITRUST

................................... 729
731
........................................

AND REGULATION

CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION
One good way to measure the importance of a court decision is to ask
how previous cases would have differed had the decision been in place earlier. By that measure, the Supreme Court's decisions in Verizon v. Trinko'
and Credit Suisse v. Billing2 turn out to be unusually significant. By broadening the conditions under which regulation blocks antitrust enforcement,
those cases redrew the boundary between antitrust and regulation and would
likely have prevented the government from bringing, in previous decades, a
number of important antitrust cases in regulated industries. Most notably,
Trinko and Credit Suisse would likely have blocked the suit by the U.S. Department of Justice ("DOJ") that in 1984 broke up AT&T's monopoly over
telephone service, considered among the most important antitrust enforcement actions in history. 4
The preclusion of such cases has strong implications for the future of
both antitrust enforcement and industrial regulation. Before 2004, the year
the Supreme Court decided Trinko, public agencies and private plaintiffs had
long enforced antitrust law in a variety of regulated settings. Several of
those cases reached the Supreme Court and many more went through lower
federal courts with no finding that they were inconsistent with the core objectives of antitrust or would interfere with regulatory objectives.- Yet many
of those cases would have difficulty surviving a motion to dismiss today.
Without specifically indentifying legal flaws or harmful consequences from
previous antitrust actions in regulated markets, the Supreme Court has in the
past decade reconfigured the relationship between antitrust law and regula1.

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).

2.

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).

3. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), aff'd sub nom. Maryland v.
United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
4.

See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW 11

(2d ed. 2001) ("[Ilt is strongly argu-

able that the divestiture of AT&T was the most successful antitrust structural remedy in history.");
Anne K. Bingaman, Ass't Att'y Gen., Antitrust Div., U.S. Dept. of Justice, Innovation and Antitrust
Speech (July 29, 1994), (transcript available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/speeches/
innovate.htm) (calling the AT&T divestiture "[t]he best and most important example in U.S. history"
of an antitrust action to promote economic growth and innovation).
5.

See infra Part I.
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tion to make it much more difficult for antitrust law to play an important
role in regulated markets-a limitation this Article will argue is potentially
costly and unnecessarily strong.
Although the recent Supreme Court decisions on the relationship between antitrust and regulation are grounded in reasonable concerns about
the potential costs of antitrust enforcement, they cast aside several important
countervailing considerations. The Court discounted the potential for antitrust to complement regulation and to fill gaps where regulation is
unsuccessful. Moreover, the Court presented little basis for its strong assumptions about the high costs of antitrust and mostly ignored the costs of
regulation. This is a particularly important omission because, as this Article
will argue, the relative costs of regulation and antitrust enforcement vary as
technological developments and other economic forces alter the market
structures and economic conditions of regulated industries. By limiting antitrust law's ability to step in during such transitions, the Supreme Court's
current doctrine governing the interaction of antitrust and regulation could
restrict competition policy in regulated markets to a needlessly inefficient
choice between underregulation and overregulation, to the potential detriment of American consumers and economic growth.
Part I of this Article describes the relationship between antitrust and
regulation before 2004 and examines how the Supreme Court changed that
relationship through its decisions in Trinko and Credit Suisse. It then offers
a critique of the Court's doctrinal and analytic reasons for limiting antitrust
in regulated markets and discusses some important questions that the
Court's decisions leave open. Part II explains why Trinko and Credit Suisse
matter by examining how their rules might have affected prior antitrust cases, notably AT&T Part III explains why Trinko and Credit Suisse are likely
to leave important gaps in market settings in which the very antitrust enforcement that the cases limit would be particularly valuable. It argues that
Trinko and Credit Suisse may limit regulators' ability to adapt their regulatory policies as competition emerges in the industries they govern, creating a
potential costly choice between underregulation and overregulation. It analyzes why default to certain common forms of regulation to fill the gap of
diminished antitrust enforcement is particularly costly as industries transition from monopoly to competition. Finally, Part IV considers how the
current state of the law could be improved while still addressing the concerns that motivated the Supreme Court to adopt its restrictive stance toward
antitrust enforcement in regulated industries.
I. THE

DOCTRINAL EVOLUTION OF REGULATORY IMMUNITY
FROM ANTITRUST LAW

Before 2004, the federal courts readily allowed public enforcement
agencies or private parties to base antitrust claims on conduct subject to
regulation and construed limits on such claims narrowly. In 1963, for example, the Supreme Court rejected the New York Stock Exchange's attempt to
block a group of securities dealers from pursuing an antitrust suit against

686

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 109:683

the exchange for having directed its members not to provide wire transfer
services to the nonmember plaintiffs. The Court ruled that the Securities
Exchange Act of 1934 allowed some self-regulatory conduct by exchanges
that might ordinarily run afoul of the antitrust laws, but held that the group
boycott at issue was outside the permissible scope of such self-regulation
and therefore not exempt from antitrust suits.' The Court's decision presumed against exemptions from Sherman Act scrutiny in order to advance
section 1's core objective of preventing anticompetitive collusion. Similarly,
in 1973 the Court affirmed the government's application of section 2 of the
Sherman Antitrust Acte ("section 2") to interconnection among rival electric
utilities.9 The Federal Power Commission ("FPC") had independent authority under the Federal Power Act to order and regulate such interconnection.'o
The Court nonetheless upheld the lower court's decision to block a dominant utility from using its control over electrical generation to exclude a
rival power distributor and monopolize the power market." The DOJ had
three times sued AT&T (in 1912, 1949, and 1974) for a variety of exclusionary practices against rivals in various telephone equipment and service
markets.12
In several of those cases, the Supreme Court expressly grappled with
whether the applicable regulation implied immunity from particular applications of antitrust law; in others, the courts implicitly resolved the question of
antitrust immunity by letting the antitrust case proceed without comment.
The key point is that the federal courts allowed the simultaneous operation
of the general antitrust statutes and an industry-specific regulatory statute.
This simultaneous operation was consistent with the respective statutory
texts. Nothing in the Communications Act, the Securities Exchange Act, or
the Federal Power Act expressly conferred immunity from antitrust law.
Congress was silent on the relationship between antitrust law and those statutes, and the Supreme Court maintained a presumption against antitrust
immunity. It established specific standards for the level of conflict-"plain
repugnancy" in the Court's words-between antitrust law and the regulatory
statute that must exist before courts can imply immunity from antitrust.
While the strength of the presumption against implied immunity from
antitrust law did not remain constant across the cases that came before Trinko and Credit Suisse, those two cases marked a significant change from the
earlier decisions. As will be discussed in detail below, Trinko expanded the
6.

Silver v. N.Y Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341 (1963).

7.

Id. at 357-60.

8.

15 U.S.C. § 2 (2008).

9.

Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973).

10.

Id. at 373.

11.

Id.

12. See STUART MINOR BENJAMIN ET
ed., 2006) (discussing the antitrust actions).
13. Otter Tail, 410 U.S. at 372.

AL., TELECOMMUNICATIONs LAW AND

POLIcY 713 (2d
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scope and rationale for implied immunity from antitrust enforcement in a
market governed by a regulatory statute that, far from being silent with regard to antitrust, contains a savings clause that expressly preserves the
simultaneous operation of antitrust and regulation. Credit Suisse extended
the idea of "repugnancy" between regulation and antitrust even to antitrust
claims that could not in fact conflict with regulatory prerogatives. To understand the impact of the Supreme Court's recent decisions, this Part begins
with a discussion of the doctrinal relationship between antitrust and regulation before Trinko and then turns to a discussion of the Trinko and Credit
Suisse decisions themselves.
A. Antitrust and Regulation Before 2004
1. Implied Immunity Without a Savings Clause

Regulatory statutes can do essentially three things with respect to the antitrust laws: (1) expressly exempt conduct in a given industry from antitrust
through a preemption or immunity clause,14 (2) expressly preserve antitrust
enforcement through a savings clause, or (3) be silent on the question.'6
Most cases involving the limits of antitrust enforcement in regulated industries have arisen in contexts where the regulatory statute at issue said
nothing about immunity. The rule that emerged from early cases, simple in
its statement if not necessarily in its application, was that the courts should
disfavor implied immunity from the antitrust laws and require antitrust to
cede to regulation only where, and to the minimum extent, necessary for the
more specific regulatory statute to achieve its purpose.
The Supreme Court characterized the standard for implied immunity as
one of "plain repugnancy" between antitrust enforcement and regulation.
In Silver v. New York Stock Exchange, for example, the Court held that

courts should try to "reconcile[] the operation of both" antitrust and regulation rather than preclude the effect of one or the other.' The Court then
allowed the plaintiff's group-boycott claim under the Sherman Act to go
forward because nothing in the Securities Act could be read to authorize
14. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 62 (2006) (the Webb-Pomerene Act, expressly exempting certain
collective export associations from antitrust liability); id. § 1012 (the McCarran-Ferguson Act, providing limited antitrust immunity to state-regulated insurance companies); id. § 17 (exempting labor
strikes).
15. See, e.g., 47 U.S.C. § 152 (2006) (expressly preserving applicability of antitrust law in
the Telecommunications Act of 1996).
16. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (securities statute governing underwriters' behavior); 16
U.S.C. §§ 824-824w (Federal Power Act); 15 U.S.C. § 79 to 79z-6 (Public Utility Holding Company Act) (repealed 2005).
17.
See, e.g., Silver v. N.Y. Stock Exch., 373 U.S. 341, 357 (1963); California v. Fed. Power
Comm'n, 369 U.S. 482, 485 (1962); Georgia v. Pa. R. Co., 324 U.S. 439, 456-57 (1945).
18. Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 267 (2007) (explaining precedent and the repugnancy standard).
19.

See 373 U.S. at 357.
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such anticompetitive conduct. 0 In Gordon v. New York Stock Exchange, Inc.,
the Court took a broader view of what constitutes repugnancy in reviewing
an antitrust claim against stockbrokers for conspiring to fix prices." The
securities laws authorized the Securities and Exchange Commission22
("SEC") to regulate brokers' rate-setting practices and approve fixed rates,
and the agency had in fact decided to prohibit the kind of rate fixing at issue. The Court nonetheless found that despite the then-current
compatibility between antitrust and regulation, the SEC's statutory authority
to allow future rate setting would be nullified by allowing the plaintiffs' antitrust suit to go forward.2 The Court held that antitrust law's potential
interference with a future exercise of regulatory powers under the securities
laws was sufficiently repugnant to warrant the implication of antitrust immunity.25
After Silver and Gordon, the caselaw thus made clear that "plain repugnancy" would be measured in terms of whether antitrust might disallow
conduct that regulators could authorize under the regulatory statute. Actual
conflict need not exist between antitrust and the actual implementation of
the regulatory statute for courts to imply immunity; the potential for conflict
would suffice.
The Court clarified in United States v. National Ass'n of Securities

Dealers("NASD") that even absent active regulatory supervision of the specific conduct at issue in an antitrust claim, a court could imply immunity if
the challenged conduct could be allowed under the statute and if the agency
generally exercised "the kind of administrative oversight of private practices
that Congress contemplated."26 Despite this broadened view of what could
constitute repugnancy between antitrust and regulation, the Court's doctrine
was grounded in the genuine potential for antitrust to reduce or impede an
agency's exercise of regulatory authority conferred by Congress.
The courts did not limit the repugnancy standard to securities regulation.
In Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, the Supreme Court declined to find

that the Federal Power Act provided immunity from the government's claim
that the defendant had violated the antitrust laws by refusing to supply either
interconnection to distribution facilities or power to competing municipal
utilities." The Supreme Court found that Otter Tail's conduct contradicted
the objectives of the statute and that the FPC had authority to prevent the
defendant's refusal to deal. Because the FPC had no authority under the
20.

See id. at 357-58, 365.

21.

422 U.S. 659 (1975).

22.

Id. at 665-67.

23.

Id. at 671-72.

24.

Id. at 689-91.

25.

Id.

26.

422 U.S. 694, 728 (1975).

27.

410 U.S. 366 (1973).

28.

Id. at 373-74.

March 201l]

RebalancingAntitrust and Regulation

689

statute to authorize the refusals to deal at issue, however, the antitrust claims
could only be duplicative of, but not repugnant to, any actual or potential
exercise of the FPC's regulatory authority. The Otter Tail decision therefore
shows that mere overlap between antitrust and regulation was not a valid
basis for implied immunity.
In Phonotele, Inc. v. AT&T, a case decided under the Communications
Act of 1934 (as it existed before the 1996 amendments that added an antitrust savings clause), the Ninth Circuit denied implied immunity from
antitrust claims directly related to conduct the Federal Communications
Commission ("FCC") had regularly and actively overseen and regulated.29
The plaintiff sued on grounds that AT&T had violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act by denying customers the ability to connect a device that the
plaintiff manufactured to the telephone network. AT&T claimed implied
immunity on grounds that the Communications Act gave the FCC jurisdiction over such matters and that the FCC had in fact consistently held
proceedings and issued orders on precisely the conduct of which plaintiff
complained. The Ninth Circuit rejected a broad reading of Gordon and
NASD and held that the antitrust suit reinforced, but was not repugnant to,
the FCC's regulation of the allegedly monopolistic conduct." Key to the
court's decision was the fact that from the FCC's perspective, the mere fact
of overlap did not imply repugnancy because there was no conflict between
the FCC's regulatory position against AT&T's conduct and the antitrust
law's potential imposition of liability for those activities." The Ninth Circuit
thus distinguished overlap from repugnancy and dismissed the likelihood of
potential conflict in the future. Phonotele shares essential features of the
DOJ's 1974 antitrust suit that culminated in the break-up of AT&T in 1984,
which will be further discussed in Section I.A.2 below.
2. Immunity and Statutes with an Antitrust Savings Clause

There is little caselaw prior to 2004 addressing the relationship between
antitrust and regulatory statutes that contain savings clauses expressly preserving antitrust enforcement. The two notable cases, one of which is the
Second Circuit's decision in Trinko itself, both arose under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which expressly saves the simultaneous application
of antitrust law in telecommunications markets.
In brief, the Telecommunications Act of 1996 sets up a system of regulation to encourage competition in the market for local telephone services."
While expressly providing that "nothing in this Act ... shall be construed to

29.

664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981).

30.

Id. at 727-30.

31.

Id. at 733-35.

32.

§ 601(b)(1), 47 U.S.C. § 152 historical note (2006).

33.

See id. § 101, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251-261.
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modify, impair, or supersede the applicability of any of the antitrust laws,"4
the statute directs the FCC to implement rules under which incumbent telephone monopolies must provide access to their network facilities to new
competitors, known as "competitive local exchange providers" ("CLECs"),
whose market entry would be impaired absent such "unbundling" of incumbent networks. The ensuing FCC rules allow a new entrant wishing to
provide phone service to a customer in a given area to have the incumbent
connect the customer's line to the new entrant's routing and billing equipment. In this way, new entrants can provide service without first having to
build all the costly "last mile" lines to each customer. Two cases arose in
which private plaintiffs filed antitrust claims against the incumbent carriers
in their local markets for failing to deal properly under the 1996 act with the
CLECs from whom the plaintiffs were trying to purchase telephone service.
These cases led to the first court decisions interpreting the effect of an express antitrust savings clause on the scope of antitrust claims a plaintiff can
raise against a regulated firm.
The first case is the Seventh Circuit's decision in Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp.5 Plaintiffs alleged that Ameritech had violated section 2 of the
Sherman Act by refusing to comply with the local competition provisions of
the Telecommunications Act of 1996. The court found that the plaintiffs had
failed to support their antitrust claim with any allegation of conduct that was
independent of the duties to deal with rivals specifically listed in the FCC's
regulations implementing the 1996 act.1 Finding those regulations to go
well beyond what antitrust alone would require in terms of a duty to deal
and finding nothing at all in plaintiff's pleading stating that defendant's actions would violate section 2 in absence of the regulations, the Seventh
Circuit held that plaintiffs failed to state a basis for antitrust liability and
affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the claims. The 1996 act's antitrust
savings clause did not come into play because the court found that the plaintiff had never stated an antitrust claim whose relationship to the regulatory
scheme needed to be analyzed.
Two years later, in Trinko," the Second Circuit came to a different result
in a case virtually identical to Goldwasser. The incumbent provider of local
telephone service in New York City was Bell Atlantic, which later merged
with GTE in 2000 to form Verizon. One CLEC attempting to enter the local
telephone market in New York City was AT&T, which had been out of the
local telephone business since its divestiture in 1984. Plaintiff Curtis V.
Trinko was one of the retail customers AT&T signed up. AT&T faced delays

34.

Id. § 601(b)(1), 47 U.S.C § 152 historical note.

35.

222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).

36.

Goldwasser, 222 F.3d at 396.

37.

Id. at 401-02.

38. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89 (2d Cir. 2002), rev'd sub
nom. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (2004).
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in providing service to Trinko's law office because of a dispute with Bell
Atlantic over AT&T's access to Verizon's network facilities."
Ostensibly because he could not obtain his choice of telephone service
provider, the plaintiff sued Verizon under section 2 of the Sherman Antitrust
Act as well as under the Communications Act and sought class certification
for similarly situated customers. He claimed that Verizon discriminated
against rivals like AT&T by failing to supply them with the network connections they needed to provide service to customers like Trinko's law office4:
Bell Atlantic has not afforded CLECs access to the local loop on a par with
its own access. Among other things, Bell Atlantic has filled orders of
CLEC customers after fulfilling those for its own local phone service, has
failed to fill in a timely manner, or not at all, a substantial number of orders for CLEC customers substantially identical in circumstances to its
own local phone service customers for whom it has filled orders on a timely basis, and has systematically failed to inform CLECs of the status of
their customers' orders with Bell Atlantic.
Each of Verizon's allegedly illegal actions specified in the complaint involved a breach of a regulatory duty under the 1996 act. The Second Circuit
explained the complaint as follows:
Consequently, the plaintiff claims Bell Atlantic violated the various duties
imposed on it as an ILEC by subsections (b) and (c) of section 251 of the
Telecommunications Act and its duties as a common carrier under section
202(a) of the Communications Act. The amended complaint also alleges
that Bell Atlantic's conduct had no valid business reason and was intended
to exclude competition from the market "by making it difficult for its competitors to provide service in the Local Phone Service market on the level
that Bell Atlantic is able to provide to its customers in that market."42
The plaintiff's suit on its face focused on violations of the telecommunications statutes; the general harm to competition and lack of valid business
justification that might provide independent substance for an antitrust claim
appear, without specificity, in an amendment to Trinko's complaint. The
district court thus dismissed Trinko's suit for failing to state an antitrust
claim distinct from Verizon's alleged violation of the 1996 act, which the
plaintiff had no standing to enforce.4 3

39.

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402-05.

40.

Id. at 404-05.

Trinko, 305 F.3d at 95 (quoting Amended Complaint at 21, Law Offices of Curtis V.
41.
Trinko, v. Bell Atl. Corp, 123 F. Supp. 2d 738 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 1910)).
42. Id. (quoting Amended Complaint at 152, Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko v. Bell Atl.
Corp, 123 F. Supp. 2d 738 (S.D.N.Y 2000) (No. 00 Civ. 1910)).
43. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 405. The plaintiff had no standing to sue directly under the 1996 act,
which does not provide private rights of action in federal court. N. Cnty. Comm. Corp. v. Calif.
Catalog & Tech., 594 F.3d 1149 (9th Cir. 2010). Whether the plaintiff had standing to sue under the
antitrust laws as an "indirect purchaser" is also unclear; the Trinko majority did not address the
issue, although Justice Stevens in dissent, joined by Justices Thomas and Souter, would have decided the case solely on the basis that Trinko lacked standing. 540 U.S. at 416-17.
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The Second Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and reinstated
the suit on grounds that the plaintiff's complaint could be interpreted as raising section 2 claims independent of any statutory duties under the 1996
act." The court first noted that the plaintiff did not even specifically mention
section 251 of the 1996 act in his complaint, although it is clear from the
facts he pleaded that he was referring to a breach of that and other sections
of the act. The court then stated that "[tihe allegations in the amended complaint describe conduct that may support an antitrust claim under a number
of theories," 45 specifically that "the amended complaint may state a claim
under the 'essential facilities' doctrine"" and that "the plaintiff may have a
monopoly leveraging claim."47 As the word "may" in the Second Circuit's
discussion of the complaint suggests, the plaintiff's amended complaint was
vague. In each instance the court went on to describe the kinds of facts and
basic legal elements the plaintiff might plead in support of such antitrust
claims.48 The clear implication is that plaintiff had pleaded neither the facts
nor the basic elements of any antitrust claims in his actual amended complaint and that the court was adopting a very liberal pleading standard.
As a technical matter, the Second Circuit's decision does not conflict
with Goldwasser's holding that the antitrust claim must have a basis independent from the defendant's purely regulatory obligations, because the
Second Circuit found such an independent section 2 claim in Trinko's complaint (the Seventh Circuit did not find one in Goldwasser's suit). The
tension between the courts is mostly in how generously they read the pleadings. But, because the Second Circuit found Trinko to have pleaded
potentially valid claims under antitrust law, his case at least implicitly raised
the question of the extent to which the 1996 act's savings clause preserved
antitrust jurisdiction, a question the circuit court answered in allowing Trinko to pursue even his very vague section 2 allegation.
It is hard to know what to infer about the relationship between antitrust
and regulation from the Second Circuit's decision in Trinko. Even if one
assumes the refusal-to-deal claim had an independent basis in antitrust law,
it was a claim that directly implicated duties to deal governed by FCC rules.
If a court were to find that Verizon was not liable under section 2 for refusing to deal, that result would have no bearing on Verizon's regulatory
obligations. On the other hand, if a court were to find section 2 liability, the
result would either duplicate or expand the regulatory duty to deal. Duplication of the regulatory duty through antitrust enforcement might be
unnecessary when the regulation is enforced, but would need not conflict
with the FCC's full exercise of its authority under the 1996 act and could be
justified under the act's savings clause. Expansion of regulatory obligations,
44.

Trinko, 305 F.3d at 108.

45.

Id.

46.

Id.

47.

Id.

48.

Id.
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however, could interfere with the agency's administration of the statutory
scheme; it might, for example, nullify a regulatory decision not to extend the
duty to deal as far as the court saw fit to do under antitrust, even if that regulatory decision was based on the agency's finding that more extensive duties
to deal would be contrary to the statute's objectives.
The Second Circuit sidestepped the relationship between the plaintiff's
antitrust claim and the 1996 act by finding that "[t]he savings clause unambiguously establishes that there is no 'plain repugnancy' between the
Telecommunications Act and the antitrust statutes." 49 But such an interpretation of the savings clause is too strong. While that clause should be read to
preserve antitrust enforcement where at all possible, it would be contrary to
the general treatment of savings clauses to read it as preserving general antitrust law where so doing would impede the specific statutory mandates and
objectives.so Whether such impediment actually exists can only be determined case by case, and while such actual conflict may be unusual, it is
strained to read the savings clause as deeming it to be impossible. The Second Circuit's decision thus provides little guidance as to how genuine
conflicts between antitrust and regulation should be managed in the presence of an antitrust savings clause. But neither the Second Circuit in Trinko
nor the Seventh Circuit in Goldwassergave any hint that regulation pursuant
to a statute with an antitrust savings clause could be grounds for blocking a
properly pleaded antitrust claim. Both in those cases and in the implied immunity cases involving statutes without antitrust-specific savings clauses,
the prevailing doctrine was premised on preserving the domain of antitrust
law, at least to the extent possible without conflicting with the underlying
regulatory statute.
B. Antitrust and Regulation After 2004

1. Verizon v. Trinko
After the Second Circuit reinstated Trinko's complaint, the Supreme
Court granted certiorari "limited to the question whether the Court of Appeals erred in reversing the District Court's dismissal of respondent's
antitrust claims."" More specifically, the Supreme Court phrased the question before it in Trinko as "whether a complaint alleging breach of the
incumbent's duty under the 1996 act to share its network with competitors
states a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act."52 Several background
facts related to the status of refusal-to-deal claims under section 2 of the
Sherman Act and the FCC's implementation of the 1996 act's regulatory

49.

Id. at 109.

50. Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust and the Regulatory Enterprise, 2004 COLUm. Bus. L.
REv. 335, 375-76 (citing Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861 (2000)).
51.

Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 405 (2004).

52.

Id. at 401.
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framework provide important context for the Court's consideration of that
question.
First, Trinko's claim was essentially that Verizon should be held liable
for refusing to deal with its competitor AT&T on equal terms. A firm's unilateral refusal to deal with a competitor on particular terms or at all, while
long recognized as a potential basis for antitrust liability under limited circumstances, has always been one of the hardest claims for a plaintiff to
win." Although the conditions for such liability were perhaps not as stringent as the Supreme Court retrospectively found them to be in Trinko,4 it is
fair to say that even under the best of circumstances the plaintiff bore a
heavy burden to show Verizon had violated antitrust laws.
Second, the FCC's regulations implementing the 1996 act directly address the conduct at issue and impose duties to deal on incumbent telephone
carriers that are at least as strong as, and likely much stronger than, any that
could be established under section 2 of the Sherman Act. Any duty to deal
under the Sherman Act at a minimum requires a showing that (1) the defendant has monopoly power and (2) the defendant's refusal to deal was on
balance anticompetitive and devoid of a valid business justification." The
1996 act requires only a finding by the FCC that, without access to the incumbent's network facilities, a new entrant would be "impaired]" in
entering the market, 6 a much weaker standard. As the Supreme Court explained, the 1996 act tries to eliminate legally established monopolies while
the Sherman Act tries only to prevent illegal monopolization." A firm's refusal to deal could therefore easily violate the 1996 act without violating the
Sherman Act.
Taken together, these facts put Trinko's antitrust claim in an unsympathetic light from the outset. His section 2 claim was at best weak and
duplicative of ongoing regulation; it was at worst an attempt to use antitrust
law as a cover for bringing a class action suit he did not have standing to file
under the 1996 act and to use that act as a basis for liability he would be
unlikely to establish under antitrust law. It is therefore not surprising that the
Supreme Court took a dim view of Trinko's suit and remanded the case for
dismissal. The significance of the case is not that the Court reached that result in this particular case, but in the broad reasoning through which it did
so.

53. Howard A. Shelanski, UnilateralRefusals to Deal in Intellectual and Other Property,76
ANTITRUST L.J. 369 (2009).
54.

See infra notes 62-72 and accompanying text.

55. This is the basic rule-of-reason inquiry for all section 2 claims. See, e.g., U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, Antitrust Resource Manual, pt. 7, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/eousa/foia
readingroom/usam/title7/antOO007.htm.
56. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2)(B) (2006); see also AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999)
(discussing the impairment standard).
57.

Trinko, 540 U.S. at 415.
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a. The Court Could Have Answered the Question
PresentedNarrowly

The Court could have most narrowly resolved the case on grounds that
the plaintiff had pleaded only the statutory violation and no facts or law
from which a court could reasonably conclude that Verizon's conduct met
the standards for liability under section 2. To the extent Trinko was trying
to bootstrap an alleged violation of the FCC's unbundling rules into an antitrust claim, he could not do so without pleading facts on which section 2
would impose the same duty to deal independently of the 1996 act. Given
the characteristics of the regulation and antitrust claim at issue in Trinko,
such a ruling would be consistent with the 1996 act's savings provision governing the relationship between antitrust law and telecommunications
regulation.
The two critical attributes of the 1996 act for current purposes are that it
preserves but does not modify antitrust law and that it imposes duties to deal
that are at least as strong as any that antitrust law might impose. The critical
characteristic of the plaintiff's refusal-to-deal claim under section 2 of the
Sherman Act is its qualified and limited recognition in antitrust precedent.
Taken together, those factors make the dismissal of Trinko's antitrust suit
look obvious and reasonable. Where regulation is more demanding than
antitrust, allowing mere allegation of a regulatory breach to be the basis for
a section 2 antitrust claim risks allowing the regulation to modify the scope
of antitrust law, in contravention of the 1996 act's savings clause. As the
Court found, just as that clause "preserves claims that satisfy existing antitrust standards, it does not create new claims that go beyond existing
antitrust standards." 59
Moreover, where the basis for antitrust liability is very limited, as in the
case of unilateral refusals to deal under section 2, barring allegations of regulatory breaches from sufficing to support an antitrust claim is particularly
unlikely to contradict the savings clause's main purpose of preserving the
operation of antitrust law in telecommunications markets. Both antitrust and
telecommunications law provide grounds for reversing the Second Circuit's
decision to allow Trinko's "antitrust" claim to proceed, as Trinko made no
effort to show that his particular claim fell within the limited zone of refusal-to-deal liability recognized under the Sherman Act rather than in the
more expansive duties to deal of the 1996 act.
Under a narrow ruling-that breaches of the broad 1996 act duties to
deal do not suffice to plead a violation of section 2's much more limited
duties to deal-the Supreme Court would have provided important procedural guidance to lower courts and litigants but more limited guidance on
the substantive scope of antitrust law. That narrow ruling would not be trivial: requiring antitrust plaintiffs to plead section 2 claims as violations of
58. The Court later adopted such a procedural approach to limiting weak antitrust claims in
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).
59.

540 U.S. at 407.
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antitrust law instead of invoking breaches of regulatory obligations would
force plaintiffs to anchor their claims in relevant antitrust facts and precedent. But such improved pleading would still leave open the question of
what courts should do when a plaintiff files an antitrust claim of first impression-i.e., one that would expand the boundaries of precedent-against
a regulated firm but without reference to that firm's regulatory obligations.
A ruling that narrowly answered the question presented would leave
open the possibility that a lower court would decide that, putting aside the
FCC's rules and remedies, antitrust law should independently recognize a
more extensive range of refusals to deal as grounds for liability than it had
in the past. The Trinko decision forecloses this possibility. First, the Court
redefined the existing limits of refusal-to-deal liability under section 2 of the
Sherman Act to exclude liability for Verizon's refusal to deal, no matter how
well pleaded as an antitrust violation.6 Second, the Court introduced a costbenefit analysis that bars lower courts from considering any expansion of
those existing limits of section 2 in the presence of competition-oriented
regulation.' In so doing, the Court went well beyond the question of whether an alleged breach of the 1996 act suffices to state an antitrust claim.
The questions the Court really answered were, first, where the limits of
refusal-to-deal liability are under section 2 of the Sherman Act and, second,
whether a claim for expansion of existing grounds for antitrust liability
could be heard against a regulated firm. The Trinko Court's rulings on these
questions affect cases well beyond those that involve the relationship between 1996 act regulation and antitrust law's duties to deal. They make it
harder for antitrust claims to proceed against firms subject to any competition-oriented regulation, even where the antitrust claim is stronger and the
regulation weaker than was the case in Trinko.
b. Limiting Liabilityfor Refusals to Deal Under Section 2

When regulation imposes more extensive duties or limitations on firms
than antitrust law, plaintiffs might obtain remedies contemplated under neither antitrust nor regulation if courts allow breach of a purely regulatory
duty to suffice for an antitrust violation. In such cases, the line between
claims recognized in antitrust and those potentially recognized only under
the regulatory statute becomes important. It then makes sense for courts to
require antitrust plaintiffs to show that their antitrust claims stand on their
own as a matter of antitrust law, independent of the defendant's regulatory
obligations. The plaintiff in Trinko did not come close to carrying this burden: as discussed above, he appeared to be using the 1996 act to establish a
violation he would have trouble arguing under antitrust law and using antitrust law to get standing he could not get under the 1996 act.
The Supreme Court, however, ruled that the plaintiff could not have established his refusal-to-deal claim under antitrust law no matter how he
60.

Id.at410-l1.

61.

Id. at 414.
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pleaded his case. The Court found that refusal-to-deal liability lies at the
outer boundary of section 2 liability-and indeed mostly outside that boundary.62 In concluding that the duties to deal under the 1996 act went beyond
relief recognizable under the antitrust laws and that any antitrust claim
based on the statutory duties should be denied, the Court read antitrust
precedent on unilateral refusals to deal restrictively. Despite several cases in
which the Supreme Court and lower courts had found grounds to hold do61
minant firms liable for the denial of an essential input to competitors, the
Court in Trinko disclaimed ever having sanctioned an "essential facilities"
doctrine or any other general basis for refusal-to-deal liability.
The Court acknowledged that it had upheld liability for a unilateral refusal to deal in Aspen Skiing v. Aspen Highlands.6 But it emphasized the
unusual and specific facts of that case-notably, a prior course of dealing
with the plaintiff and none but an anticompetitive explanation for changing
course-and described Aspen as being "at or near the outer boundary of
Section 2 liability."6 The facts of Trinko not fitting those of Aspen, the Court
found that the plaintiff could not state a recognized antitrust claim: as a doctrinal matter, the Court found that Trinko's claim simply fell outside the
scope of established section 2 liability.
It is indisputable that the federal courts have always interpreted antitrust
law with a strong presumption against mandating that a firm deal with its
competitors, and for good reason: such duties could interfere with a firm's
incentives to invest and innovate and might punish firms for the very kind of
68
conduct-aggressive competition-that the antitrust laws seek to promote.
But successful duty-to-deal claims were neither as novel nor as improbable
as the Court found them to be in Trinko. To reach its conclusion that the
kind of dealing with a competitor addressed by the 1996 act was novel to
antitrust law, the Court arguably engaged in some sleight of hand by altering
ex post the substantive scope of section 2 liability for refusals to deal, redrawing the boundary of liability to ensure that Trinko's claim would fall
beyond the limits of existing antitrust precedent.
At the time Trinko filed his suit, however, courts had not yet applied as
strong a presumption against liability for unilateral refusals as the Supreme
Court later held there to be. Aspen itself neither adopted such a skeptical
62.

Id. at 409.

63. Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585 (1985); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366 (1973); MCI Commc'ns Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081,
1092 (7th Cir. 1983); Phonotele, Inc. v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981).
64.

540U.S.at410-11.

65.

Id. at 409.

66.

Id.

67. For an analysis of why even this conclusion of the Court is subject to question, and in
turn why it is unclear how much of Aspen actually survives Trinko, see Eleanor M. Fox, Is There
Life in Aspen After Trinko? The Silent Revolution of Section 2 of the Sherman Act, 73 ANTiTRUsT
L. J. 153 (2005).
68.

540 U.S. at 407-08.
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posture toward refusal-to-deal claims nor confined liability for such conduct
to its own facts, as the Court retrospectively did in Trinko. To the contrary,
in Aspen the Court considered itself already to have "squarely held" in Lorain Journa6 that a monopolist's right to exclude competition through a
refusal to deal is a qualified one."o Whereas Trinko expressly cabined refusal-to-deal liability to the facts of Aspen, the Court in Aspen itself adopted
a more flexible approach in stating that "[t]he qualification on the right of a
monopolist to deal with whom he pleases is not so narrow that it encompasses no more than the circumstances of Lorain Journal."" The Trinko
Court interpreted Aspen to narrow Lorain Journal, whereas the Aspen Court
read Lorain as a broader rule that could apply to the specific facts of the
Aspen case.

It is also hard to reconcile the Court's description of refusal-to-deal liability with Otter Tail, in which the Court had no difficulty allowing
antitrust claims that involved pure refusal to deal to proceed in the regulated
power sector. In Trinko, the Court suggested that Otter Tail fit the facts of
Aspen because the defendant power company was refusing to supply some
municipal utilities with the same goods and services it was already providing to others.72 But if the Court is thereby implying that dealing with one
firm could trigger antitrust liability for refusal to deal with other firms, then
that rule is broader than Aspen's. In Aspen the key point was that the defendant had previously dealt with the very same party with whom it later
refused to deal. By discounting that distinction between Aspen and Otter
Tail, the Court would curtail a seller's discretion more than Aspen itself
might do. Moreover, if the Court means what it said about Otter Tail, then it
could be hard to distinguish Trinko's refusal-to-deal claim if Verizon was
refusing to supply AT&T the same kind of access it was supplying to other
competitive entrants into the local telecommunications market. If Otter Tail
and not Aspen more accurately describes the outer boundary of section 2
liability, then the claim at issue in Trinko, though perhaps weak, may not
look novel.
Even with its doctrinal revisionism, had the Court in Trinko stopped at
explaining the scope of section 2 and preventing the importation of duties
from a regulatory statute into claims under the antitrust laws, it would have
accomplished two things: it would have established the anti-bootstrapping
principle, thereby keeping statutory duties and grounds for antitrust liability
independent; and, for better or worse, it would have clarified the substantive
antitrust law on refusals to deal to make it harder in all cases for plaintiffs to
make such claims, whether in regulated industries or not. Harder, however,
does not mean impossible. The Trinko Court did not make unilateral refusals
to deal legal per se; it did not expressly overrule Aspen or any other relevant

69.

Lorain Journal Co. v. United States, 342 U.S. 143 (1951).

70.

Aspen, 472 U.S. at 601.

71.

Id. at 603.
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Trinko, 540 U.S. at 410.
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precedent, and it back-handedly implied that some circumstances beyond
those of Aspen could justify a mandate to deal with a rival."
The Court's holding on the limits of existing refusal-to-deal liability under section 2 therefore does not in itself prevent a plaintiff with a claim
against a regulated firm from asking a court to find that the facts of a particular case warrant addition to the preexisting grounds for antitrust liability.
The Court, however, took a further step to foreclose the possibility that federal courts will actually hear such claims, even if those claims contain facts
and arguments rooted in the purposes of antitrust law rather than in the applicable regulatory statute. Indeed, the Court at this point expressly
broadened its formulation of the question presented, saying, "The question
before us today is whether the allegations of respondent's complaint fit
within existing [grounds for refusal-to-deal liability] or provide a basis, under traditional antitrust principles, for recognizing a new one."74
c. BarringExpansion ofAntitrust Liability in Regulated Industries

In part IV of its opinion, the Court examined whether "traditional antitrust principles" would justify adding Verizon's alleged refusal to deal to the
kinds of conduct for which antitrust law imposes liability. The Court answered in the negative, and not just because of the particular facts of
Trinko. The Court grounded its analysis in observations about the relative
costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement and then turned those observations into presumptions in cases involving regulated industries. The Court
found that where there exists "a regulatory structure designed to deter and
remedy anticompetitive harm,"77 antitrust law should be modestly enforced
because "the additional benefit to competition provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small, and it will be less plausible that the antitrust
laws contemplate such additional scrutiny.""
The Court cited Silver and NASD, two implied immunity cases, as authority for factoring the costs and benefits of antitrust into its consideration
of whether antitrust claims of first impression should be allowed against a
regulated firm: "[J]ust as regulatory context may in other cases serve as a
basis for implied immunity, it may also be a consideration in deciding
whether to recognize an expansion of the contours of § 2."' There is a fundamental difference, however, between the reasoning of the implied
immunity precedent the Court cited and the Court's reasoning in Trinko.
Under Silver and NASD, the critical requirement for immunity is
73.

See id. at 411.

74.

See id. at 408.

75.

Id. at 411.

76.

Id. at 411-12.

77.

Id. at 412.
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Id.

79.

Id. at 412 (internal citation omitted).
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"repugnance"-the real prospect of conflict-between antitrust and regulation. That conflict requirement was not, however, the basis for Trinko's
preclusion of novel antitrust claims against regulated firms. The Court's reasoning instead hinged upon the costs of antitrust enforcement and the
reduced likelihood in regulated industries that the benefits of additional antitrust enforcement would offset those costs. 80
Were conflict between antitrust and regulation the Court's main concern,
it could have ruled that an antitrust savings clause, in addition to not implicitly enlarging antitrust liability through regulation, should not be interpreted
as an antitrust supremacy clause under which the statute's regulatory provisions impliedly yield to antitrust law in cases where the latter would actually
and directly interfere with the former. Such a conflict-based rule to preclude
the antitrust claim in Trinko would have been consistent with the Court's
implied immunity precedent and would have given effect to the antitrust
savings clause to the extent possible without compromising the regulatory
statute. Instead of an inquiry into conflict between antitrust and regulation,
however, Trinko focused on the questionable marginal benefits of adding
antitrust enforcement on top of existing regulation."
On one hand, the Court's argument about the relevance of regulation to
the net benefits of antitrust enforcement is perfectly sound. Regulation can
make it more difficult to assess anticompetitive harms for purposes of an
antitrust case. For even if antitrust and regulation are consistent with each
other, regulation's influence on the economic structure and conduct of an
industry might make it harder for antitrust enforcers to link particular competitive effects to the defendant's conduct and to design suitable remedies.
Because economic regulation usually changes the terms on which market
participants interact, the competitive effects and justifications relevant to the
rule-of-reason inquiry are likely to change depending on whether or not
regulation is taken into account. It therefore makes sense that precedent requires courts to take account of the nature and pervasiveness of state and
federal regulation and of the particular legal and economic setting of any
industry in which antitrust law is being applied.s2 As Herbert Hovenkamp
has argued, the case-by-case determination of whether antitrust should apply
or yield to active regulation of the conduct at issue is precisely the kind83of
antitrust inquiry that the savings clause should be interpreted to preserve.
On the other hand, the Court did not base its skepticism toward expansive antitrust enforcement against regulated firms on the difficulties
regulation may create for the application of antitrust law. Nor did it ground
its skepticism on the prospect of conflict between general antitrust law and
the specific objectives of the regulatory statute. Instead it barred expansion
of antitrust liability because it found the marginal benefit of antitrust en80.

Id. at 414.
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82. Id. at 411 (citing United States v. Citizens & S. Nat'1 Bank, 422 U.S. 86, 91 (1975), and
Town of Concord, Mass. v. Bos. Edison Co., 915 F.2d 17, 22 (1st Cir. 1990)).
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forcement against conduct already governed by regulation to be too small to
justify the potential costs. The Court's implication that its reason for blocking the expansion of section 2 follows from the implied immunity cases8
falls apart on even cursory analysis. The implied immunity cases hinge on
antitrust law's conflicts with regulation, while Trinko hinged on antitrust
law's potential duplication of regulation. The former was clearly inconsistent with the statutes in the relevant cases; the latter was expressly provided
for in the savings clause of the regulatory statute at issue in Trinko.
Moreover, the Court did not simply instruct lower courts to take account
of the case-specific marginal benefits of antitrust before they decide whether
to allow a novel or aggressive antitrust claim against a regulated firm. Instead, the language of the opinion makes clear the Court's view that the net
benefits of antitrust in the presence of regulation should be weighed with a
strong, skeptical presumption. In stating that in the presence of competitionoriented regulation that benefits of antitrust will "tend to be small," that application of section 2 can be difficult "under the best of circumstances," and
that mistakes in enforcing section 2 "are especially costly,"" the Court
placed a firm thumb on the scales of any lower court's determination of
whether an expansive antitrust claim should be allowed against a regulated
firm. This presumption against lower courts' ability to hear the merits of
boundary-pushing antitrust claims is in tension not only with the 1996 act's
savings clause, but also with the Court's own pronouncement in Gordon that
"the determination of whether implied repeal of the antitrust laws is necessary to make [a regulatory statute] work is a matter for the courts, and in
particular, for the courts in which the antitrust claims are raised."
d. Unclear Standardsfor Regulation

The Court's presumption that expansion of antitrust in the presence of
relevant regulation would be too costly appears harmless on the facts of
Trinko itself. Even absent such a presumption, it seems unlikely that a district court would find the antitrust claim to be worthwhile given the nature
of the claim and the direct correspondence between the underlying refusal to
deal and the FCC's network-access rules. But nothing in the Trinko opinion
confines the Court's presumption about the costs of antitrust in regulated
industries to the facts of the case.
Trinko stated that one key factor in deciding whether to recognize an
antitrust claim against a regulated firm "is the existence of a regulatory
structure designed to deter and remedy anticompetitive harm," because
"[w]here such a structure exists, the additional benefit to competition
provided by antitrust enforcement will tend to be small."" The Court made
clear its view that the regulation at issue in Trinko itself directly addressed
84.
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the allegedly illegal conduct and was actively overseen by the FCC." Had
the Court made equally clear that to preclude antitrust claims a regulatory
structure must, like the one at issue in Trinko, be directly relevant to the
conduct at issue, be as demanding as antitrust law, and be actively
administered, one might worry less about any collateral consequences for
legitimate antitrust cases.
The Court did not, however, tie its decision to the particular attributes of
the regulations at issue in Trinko or establish any standard that a regulatory
program must meet to preclude antitrust claims. The Court instead offers as
the contrasting scenario in which antitrust might be worthwhile the case
where "'[t]here is nothing built into the regulatory scheme which performs
the antitrust function.' "" Between "nothing" and the actively enforced duties to deal under the 1996 act there is a lot of room.
Unanswered in Trinko is the important question of whether the competition-focused regulation has to correspond closely to the conduct at issue and
be actively enforced or whether its mere existence on the books is sufficient
to forestall aggressive antitrust claims. At the heart of this question is what
constitutes a "regulated" firm for purposes of Trinko's preclusion of aggressive antitrust claims. Trinko counseled courts to dismiss even well-pleaded
claims to expand antitrust liability beyond its existing boundaries when
those claims are made against regulated firms, whereas an unregulated firm
may have to fight those same claims on the merits under antitrust law's rule
of reason. In Trinko, the Court confronted a combination of statutory authority to regulate the conduct at issue, agency rules that implemented that
authority, and active administration and enforcement of the regulations by
the agency. But what if one of the latter two elements is missing or present
in a weaker form than in Trinko? Future antitrust claims could arise against
firms subject to a relevant regulatory statute but where the agency has not
implemented rules, or where the agency has promulgated regulations that do
not directly govern the allegedly anticompetitive conduct, or where the
agency does not actively administer or enforce its rules. The Trinko decision
left open the question of where along this spectrum of possibilities a firm
becomes sufficiently "regulated" for the Court's rule against boundaryexpanding antitrust claims to apply.
This is a key question after Trinko. If a presumption against antitrust can
apply absent active enforcement of a regulatory statute that ostensibly "performs the antitrust function," then a little regulation could be a dangerous
thing for competition enforcement in regulated industries. The risk for antitrust enforcement is that, given the Trinko Court's emphasis on the
"sometimes considerable disadvantages" of antitrust, lower courts will preclude antitrust suits where the regulatory scheme is something greater than
"nothing" but something well short of the FCC's implementation of the
1996 act's competitive access provisions.

88.

Id. at 414-15.

89.
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e. The Court'sLine Between Establishedand Expanded Grounds
for Antitrust Liability Does Not Save the Savings Clause

The 1996 act's savings clause would appear to deny courts a basis for
weighing the marginal costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement against
firms subject to regulation under the statute. Absent some interference between antitrust enforcement and the statute's specific objectives, Congress
has expressly judged antitrust law worthwhile even in parallel with FCC
rules. The Court tried to preserve the savings clause by barring only claims
against regulated firms that had not yet been recognized under antitrust law
at the time of the given suit. All previously recognized claims can proceed
through the normal litigation process and are therefore saved. There are
three reasons why this formal distinction between novel and established antitrust claims fails to give full effect to Congress's express antitrust savings
clause.
First, the Court based its rationale for distinguishing between new and
previously recognized antitrust claims on the savings clause's statement that
the 1996 act does not "modify" antitrust law. That statement provides a
sound basis for not allowing statutory breaches themselves to supply the
basis for antitrust liability. But if a plaintiff makes an argument for adding
certain conduct to that already recognized as illegal under antitrust law
without reference to the statute and based solely on the goals and principles
of antitrust law itself, then any modification of preexisting antitrust would
be the result of the court's application of antitrust law's rule of reason, not
its enforcement of the regulatory statute. Where the modification has nothing to do with the 1996 act (or with some future statute with the same
savings clause), preventing the modification cannot be justified by the act's
savings clause.
Second and relatedly, the Court did not preserve the entirety of existing
antitrust law as applicable to regulated firms. The Supreme Court read the
reference in the 1996 act's savings clause to "any antitrust law" to encompass only substantive antitrust doctrine, and not the provisions of the
antitrust laws that govern process. Those procedural provisions assign the
heavily fact-driven question of whether a particular course of conduct violates the law to the district courts." As with any civil suit, the district court
has authority to dismiss an antitrust claim 9' and the Supreme Court has
jurisdiction to review both final and interlocutory appeals.92 In Trinko,
however, the Court reversed the appellate court on a procedural decision
involving a claim that never had a hearing on the merits. The district court
had dismissed the case on grounds that the plaintiff was trying to assert a
claim under the 1996 act rather than under section 2 and that there was no
90.
91.

15 U.S.C. §§ 4, 25 (2006).
FED. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6).

92. See, e.g., Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451 (1992) (upholding on an interlocutory basis the Ninth Circuit's reversal of an interlocutory appeal from the
district court's grant of summary judgment in a Sherman Act section 2 tying case).
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content to plaintiff's separate antitrust cause of action. In reversing, the Second Circuit found that the plaintiff had at least stated an antitrust claim
sufficiently in line with section 2 precedent and sufficiently distinct from the
1996 act's network-access provisions to survive dismissal under rule
12(b)(6)." It was that decision rather than a ruling on the merits that the Supreme Court reviewed. A narrower ruling like that discussed earlier9 would
have restored the district court's decision on procedural grounds without
cutting off the lower courts' ability to hear properly pleaded claims for increased antitrust liability in future cases.
Although Trinko's claim was a stretch and likely would have failed once
the district court reviewed Verizon's conduct under a rule-of-reason inquiry,
the Supreme Court's decision prevents district courts from engaging in that
inquiry at all for claims that push the boundaries of antitrust in the context
of a regulated industry. While it is easy to shrug off the preclusive effect of
such a rule in the context of a weak case, the Court's decision will also bind
lower courts in cases with more complex facts and complaints that have
greater merit. The difficulties of attaching presumptions to the fact-intensive
inquiries underlying antitrust law's rule of reason or a regulatory statute's
implication of antitrust immunity are precisely why, in general, strong presumptions should not short-circuit the express procedural provisions of the
antitrust statutes .
Finally, the Supreme Court's distinction between novel and established
antitrust claims is porous. The line between a novel and an existing basis for
antitrust liability may not be clear, especially in activities analyzed under the
fact-intensive rule of reason. The Court itself recognized that there are
"myriad" means by which a firm can illegally exclude competition." The
more factual dimensions there are to a liability determination, the more likely it is that every example of some category of conduct will be
distinguishable from every other example and, therefore, to some extent a
novel application of doctrine that came before. Is a claim of liability for a
defendant's refusal to continue dealing with the plaintiff (Aspen) the same as
a claim of liability for a defendant's refusal supply the plaintiff the things
the defendant has supplied to third parties (Otter Tail)? If so, could Trinko
have made his claim nonnovel simply by alleging in his complaint that
Verizon was supplying other new entrants with the same network elements it
was allegedly refusing to supply AT&T? How would such a claim differ
from that at issue in Otter Tail, a case the Court in passing interpreted to be
within the purview of liability established by Aspen? Distinguishing novel
93.
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95. The one exception under antitrust law involves the small class of per se illegal violations
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from existing grounds for liability might therefore be a far less clear-cut task
than the Court implied.
Moreover, where the line between a novel and an existing basis for liability is blurred, the Court made clear that its major concern is with the
likelihood of false positives-i.e., of enforcement against conduct that may
constitute aggressive competition, the conduct the antitrust laws try to promote and protect-rather than with the likelihood of illicit anticompetitive
strategies. The Trinko opinion emphasized the costs of antitrust enforcement, first referring to antitrust enforcement's "sometimes considerable
disadvantages" 7 and later to how difficult antitrust cases are "[u]nder the
best of circumstances."98 The Court's error-cost discussion tells lower courts
to choose false negatives over false positives-in other words, to be generous in the definition of what constitutes expansion and parsimonious in the
definition of existing law. The Court thereby appears to have placed a thumb
on the scale in favor of finding antitrust claims to be novel, and therefore
precluded, in a market subject to competition-oriented regulation.
In sum, Trinko shows that the Court will interpret the substantive scope
of antitrust liability narrowly in regulated settings even where Congress has
expressly preserved the operation of antitrust law. This narrow interpretation
of existing law diminishes plaintiffs' recourse to antitrust claims against
regulated firms and in turn gives narrow and incomplete effect to the savings
clause. In reducing access in regulated markets to the judicial process
through which antitrust law evolves, the Court leaves it principally to regulatory agencies, rather than to courts applying the antitrust laws, to evaluate
and redress certain kinds of potentially anticompetitive conduct.
f. Trinko's Broad PotentialEffect on Antitrust
in Regulated Industries

In sum, the Court in Trinko went beyond the parameters of the question
it set out to answer at the start of the opinion. The Court did not simply rule
that pleading a violation of the 1996 act's regulatory duty to deal is insufficient to state a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act. It accomplished
that result, but as a lesser-included effect of a much broader ruling that
limited refusal-to-deal liability under section 2 in a more restrictive manner than precedent would suggest, introduced a cost-benefit rationale for
effectively barring new monopolization claims under section 2 against
regulated firms even if those claims are pleaded purely and specifically as
antitrust rather than regulatory violations, and left open how directly and
actively regulation must address the conduct that is the basis for such an
antitrust claim before the Court's rule against novel antitrust claims should
apply. While the Court's distinction between established and novel antitrust
claims might appear to preserve the 1996 act's savings clause, it does so
more as a formal than practical matter.
97.

Id. at 412.

98.

Id. at 414.
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The net result of Trinko is a reduction of the scope of antitrust enforcement against regulated firms notwithstanding the presence of an express
antitrust savings clause. Even if antitrust enforcement would not conflict
with regulation, and even if regulation does not so alter the marketplace as
to make antitrust inquiries moot or difficult to undertake, plaintiffs will face
an uphill battle in pursuing regulated firms under the Sherman Act. Plaintiffs
will bear the heavy burden of proving that their claims fall under clearly
established grounds for antitrust liability, and courts will assess those claims
through a presumption that in the presence of regulation antitrust will have
benefits too small to justify its costs.
2. Credit Suisse v. Billing
Three years after it decided Trinko, the Supreme Court decided Credit
Suisse v. Billing.99 Credit Suisse involved an attempted antitrust suit against

collusion in the underwriting of initial public offerings of securities. The
relevant regulatory statutes give the SEC authority to review joint underwriting activities and contain no specific antitrust savings clause.1 0 They do,
however, contain a general savings clause that "the rights and remedies provided by this subchapter shall be in addition to any and all other rights and
remedies that may exist at law or in equity."'0 In nonetheless finding the
securities laws to imply immunity from the plaintiffs' antitrust claim, the
Court went beyond the boundaries on immunity set by its prior cases.
The implied-immunity cases that came before Credit Suisse all drew a
line between antitrust claims that could conflict with an agency's statutory
authority to regulate a particular kind of conduct and those claims that could
not conflict principally because they addressed activities the agency had no
power either to approve or prohibit. The doctrinal progression from Silver to
Gordon to NASD interpreted agency authority and "plain repugnancy" with
increasing breadth, but those cases did not imply immunity where the conduct underlying the antitrust claim was distinct from anything the securities
laws would or could allow. In Credit Suisse, the Court applied those prior
cases, but added a prudential consideration that would preclude some antitrust claims involving conduct the agency either has no specific statutory
power to regulate or is certain to regulate in a manner that is consistent with
the antitrust laws.
a. A Judicial-ConfusionRationale

The plaintiffs in Credit Suisse had complained that defendants violated
section 1 of the Sherman Act by going beyond the kinds of joint setting of
securities prices that the securities laws allow. They alleged that the defen-

99.

Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264 (2007).

100.

See id. at 271, 276.

101.

15 U.S.C. §§ 77p(a), 78bb(a) (2006) (emphasis added).
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dants had impermissibly engaged in tying" and similar activities that are
prohibited by both antitrust laws and securities statutes. Importantly, the
Court took it as given that the defendants' conduct was unlawful under the
securities laws and would remain so.os The Court nonetheless extended the
potential-conflict rationale for immunity established by Gordon to apply
even where the antitrust claim, correctly construed, would not actually conflict with regulation. The Court reasoned that "only a fine, complex, detailed
line separates activity that the SEC permits or encourages (for which respondents must concede antitrust immunity) from activity that the SEC must
(and inevitably will) forbid."4 The Court's concern was that, because of
that fine line, trial courts would make mistakes by mischaracterizing some
allowable economic conduct in securities markets as being impermissible
under the securities laws and, in allowing antitrust challenges to that conduct, would deter underwriters from engaging in legal forms of economic
cooperation. 05 Such mistakes, the Court found, would be "clearly incompatible" with the administration of the securities laws.'
Thus, while it acknowledged tying to be plainly illegal under securities
laws, the Credit Suisse Court found that an antitrust claim for tying by underwriters could lead a court to confuse conduct other than tying, such as a
customer's mere purchase of two separate securities from the underwriter,
with the customer's being forced to purchase one of the securities in order to
buy the other.' Similarly, the facts that might show an underwriter to have
legitimately inquired into an investor's future interest in buying increased
numbers of shares could be mistakenly read to show the underwriter illegally requiring the investor to agree to buy shares at a more expensive
aftermarket price in order to be allowed to buy some shares at the initial
offering price. 00 The Court offered several other hypothetical examples before concluding that the risks of mistakes in the interpretation of securities
market activity were simply too great in antitrust cases involving securities
pricing to allow those cases to proceed.
Credit Suisse went beyond prior implied immunity cases by precluding
even antitrust claims that are based on legitimate antitrust principles, consistent with securities laws, and not even potentially repugnant to the
102. Tying involves conditioning the sale of one product (usually one over which the seller
has market power) on the buyer's agreement to also purchase a second product (usually one in
which the seller faces competition). Tying is generally subject to rule-of-reason review as a monopolizing practice (in the second product above) under the antitrust laws, but under some circumstances
it may be subject to per se liability. See Jefferson Parish Hosp. Dist. No. 2 v. Hyde, 466 U.S. 2
(1984).
103. Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 278-80 (discussing relevant SEC regulations and proposed
rules).
104.

Id.

105.

Id. at 283.

106.

Id. at 285.

107.

Id. at 279-80.

108.

Id.

109.

Id. at 283.
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regulatory scheme, where the underlying conduct is so similar to regulated
conduct that a judge might, in some other case, confuse the two and create a
conflict with regulatory authority. The Court moreover adopted a strong presumption that "antitrust courts are likely to make unusually serious mistakes
in this respect" because of "nonexpert judges" and juries and "the nuanced
nature of the evidentiary 0evaluations necessary to separate the permissible
from the impermissible."1
b. Emphasison the Costs of ErroneousAntitrust Enforcement

The Credit Suisse analysis is important because it marks the first time in
the line of implied-immunity cases that the Court has found regulation to
imply immunity from legitimate and nonrepugnant antitrust claims. In so
doing, the Court emphasized the potential effects of erroneous interpretations of fact by future courts and the costs of erroneous conflicts with the
securities laws without mentioning the costs of errors on the other side: regulatory approval of, or failure to enforce against, conduct that the agency
mistakenly places on the legitimate side of the line.
Ultimately, the Court favored regulation for two reasons. First, antitrust
enforcement could deter behavior the statute approves or encourages while
the opposite effect of regulation on the goals of antitrust is unlikely or expressly dominated by Congress's specific statutory objectives."' Second,
injured parties still have a remedy from the SEC even if barred from pursuing antitrust claims." 2 Both reasons are open to question. The case itself
involved concerted conduct at the heart of what the antitrust laws prohibit,
and the SEC had in fact failed to reach a resolution or remedy for precisely
the kind of conduct the plaintiffs were alleging. By its logic and likely practical effect, Credit Suisse contracted the scope of antitrust enforcement and
expanded the scope of implied immunity in industries regulated by statutes
that fail expressly to save the operation of antitrust law.
c. The GeneralSavings Clause Does Not Preserve the Antitrust Claims

What about the general savings clauses in the securities acts mentioned
above? The Court itself had previously interpreted those clauses to "confirm
that the remedies in each [securities] Act were to be supplemented by 'any
and all' additional remedies.""' That precedent formed the basis for Justice
Thomas's dissent in Credit Suisse from the majority's implication of antitrust immunity.' '1 Justice Thomas pointedly noted that the Sherman Act,
having been enacted in 1890, clearly falls within the "any and all other
rights and remedies" preserved by the Securities Act and the Securities Ex110.

Id. at 281-82.

111.

Id.at283-84.

112.

Id. at 283.

113.

Herman & MacLean v. Huddleston, 459 U.S. 375, 383 (1983).

114.

Credit Suisse, 551 U.S. at 287-88 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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change Act, both of which were enacted in the 1930s."' Justice Thomas thus
concluded that "both statutes explicitly save the very remedies the Court
holds to be impliedly precluded. There is no convincing argument for why
these saving provisions should not resolve this case in respondents' favor."""
The majority gave two reasons for putting aside the savings clauses, neither of them terribly compelling. The first is that the plaintiff had failed to
present the effect of the savings clauses for consideration by the lower
courts.'17 That is a peculiar rationale given that it was not the plaintiff but the
defendant who, in asking for immunity, sought a ruling in tension with the
savings clauses.
The Court's other reason for overriding the savings clauses was that two
earlier securities cases, NASD and Gordon, had implied immunity to antitrust suits notwithstanding the same savings clauses."' But that reasoning
ignores a crucial difference between Credit Suisse and those earlier cases:
the necessity of choosing between giving full effect to the securities laws
and full effect to the antitrust laws. In each of the earlier cases, the antitrust
suit, even correctly construed, could have directly conflicted with the SEC's
exercise of regulatory authority under the securities laws. In such cases, the
securities law remedies would not be "in addition" to antitrust law remedies,
but exclusive of them. With such clear "repugnancy" between the two sets
of laws, the Court had to choose between them. The Court's decision to prioritize the more specific securities laws over the more general antitrust laws
is in keeping with established cannons of statutory construction." 9 In Credit
Suisse, however, the particular antitrust suit at issue could not have conflicted with the exercise of authority under the securities laws, and the Court
therefore did not face the situation of mutual exclusivity it had faced in
NASD or Gordon.

In the wake of Trinko, in which the Court offered a cramped
interpretation of a savings clause specific to antitrust law, the outcome in
Credit Suisse is perhaps not surprising. Both cases reflected the Court's
skepticism about the marginal value of antitrust enforcement against
regulated firms and the Court's presumption about the high costs of
mistaken antitrust enforcement. In Trinko, concern about the costs of
antitrust led the Court to cabin section 2 liability for refusals to deal
generally and to bar expansion of the grounds for antitrust liability in suits
against regulated firms. In Credit Suisse, the Court's reliance on potential
future errors by trial courts to block antitrust suits gave short shrift to the
savings clause, enlarged the zone of implied immunity beyond the area of
actual or potential conflict, and discounted Congress's own judgment about

115.

Id. at 288 (quoting Securities Exchange Act of 1934 § 28, 15 U.S.C. § 78bb(a) (2006)).

116.

Id.

117.

Id. at 275 (majority opinion).

118.

Id.

119. See Morton v. Mancari, 417 U.S. 535 (1974) ("[A] specific statute will not be controlled
or nullified by a general one, regardless of [respective dates] of enactment.").
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the cost and benefits of applying other laws, beyond the securities acts, in
securities markets.
C. The Court's UnderlyingRationale: Overemphasis
on Overenforcement?

The principal reason the Court gave in Credit Suisse and Trinko for precluding antitrust claims was concern with the costs of false positives in
enforcement. The Court was unusually explicit in its aversion to the potential costs of antitrust in Trinko, notwithstanding that Congress, in including
a savings clause in the 1996 act, appeared to have taken a different view.
Cases that came after Trinko continued to raise barriers to antitrust plaintiffs
in both regulated and unregulated settings. As discussed above, Credit
Suisse conferred immunity from even well-established antitrust claims like
price-fixing if those claims involve conduct that is factually close to, though
not within, activities covered by a regulatory statute. In Twombly, the
Court increased the burden on all antitrust plaintiffs through heightened
pleading requirements.'20 Most recently, in Pacific Bell v. Linkline, the
Court virtually eliminated "price squeezes" as cognizable claims under
section 2,121 a consequence flowing in large part from the Court's interpretation of refusal-to-deal liability in Trinko.'22 Recent cases thus amplify the
Court's concern in Credit Suisse and Trinko that overenforcement of antitrust could do more to deter beneficial behavior than to prevent
anticompetitive conduct, a concern the Court found especially acute in regulated industries.

120.

See Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

121. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. Linkline Commc'ns, Inc., 129 S. Ct. 1109 (2009). A price squeeze
can arise when a monopolist in the market for a productive input is also a competitor in the market
for the final product incorporating that input. Id. at 1114. The monopolist might then try to squeeze
the profits of its wholesale customer (and downstream competitor) by first charging a high wholesale price for the necessary input and then charging consumers a low price for the final product in
which the wholesale customer competes with the monopolist. Id. at 1114-15.
122. Id. at 1119. The other requirement Linkline established for a price squeeze claim is that
the defendant's retail prices for the final product be predatory as defined in Brooke Group v. Brown
& Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993), under which the plaintiff must prove that the
defendant's retail prices were below cost and likely to give the defendant enough market power in
the future to raise prices and "recoup" the money it lost from its predatory conduct. Linkline, 129 S.
Ct. at 1120. A perplexing feature of the Linkline decision, which is beyond the scope of this Article,
is the absence of any real discussion by the Court of whether the interaction between monopoly
power in the wholesale input market and low retail pricing in the final product market should give
rise to a different definition of predatory pricing in price-squeeze cases than in straight predation
cases. The Court quickly dismissed an amicus brief's argument for taking such an interaction into
account. Id. at 1122 (citing Brief for American Antitrust Institute at 30, Linkline, 129 S. Ct. 1109
(No. 07-512)). But it did not engage the underlying economics at any depth and simply asserted the
independence for antitrust purposes of the defendant's behavior in the upstream and downstream
markets. Id. at 1122-23.
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1. Overemphasis on False Positives: Some Evidence

The Supreme Court's presumption that false positives are more costly
than false negatives in the presence of regulation is questionable on several
fronts. First, the cost-benefit assumption underlying the Court's bar to complex or novel claims against regulated firms may or may not be correct in a
given case. Its accuracy depends on a number of factors and hinges more on
empirics than systematic logic. For instance, the regulatory agency might
not actively exercise its authority. The benefits of adding antitrust enforcement will therefore not necessarily be small or marginal just because
Congress has given an agency the authority to regulate.
Second, while the Trinko opinion emphasized the costs of false positives in antitrust enforcement, precluding antitrust liability would likely
cause some number of false negatives in which anticompetitive conduct
would go unpunished. To the extent courts can distinguish conduct that
causes net harm to competition, an overinclusive rule against liability will
reduce consumer welfare. The Supreme Court took the view that the risk
and cost of false negatives is minor compared to the risk of false positives.
Even if it were true that any individual false positive result is on average
more costly than any individual false negative, it is not necessarily true
that the total costs of false positives from antitrust enforcement are higher
than the cumulative costs of false negatives. That balance depends on the
comparative frequency of false positives. In its 2007 Report and Recommendations, the Antitrust Modernization Commission discussed the
importance of avoiding both overdeterrence and underdeterrence of anticompetitive conduct, but noted in its discussion of treble damages that
"[n]o actual cases or evidence of systematic overdeterrence were presented
to the Commission."123
Third, substantive and procedural developments in antitrust law over
the past thirty years have reduced both the likelihood that cases will reach
trial and the probability that plaintiffs will win once they get there. On the
procedural side, the Supreme Court has placed limits on who can sue under the antitrust laws 24 and has raised the pleading requirements for those
who can.125 More fundamentally, the Court has increased the substantive
burdens on plaintiffs for a number of antitrust claims-in particular those
alleging monopolization under section 2 of the Sherman Act. The Supreme
Court's rulings in antitrust cases over the past twenty yearsl26 have made it
harder for plaintiffs to get to the merits, never mind win, on claims

123. ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS 247 (2007)
available at http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report_recommendation/toc.htm.
124. See, e.g., Atl. Richfield Co. v. USA Petroleum Co., 495 U.S. 328 (1990); Ill. Brick Co. v.
Illinois, 431 U.S. 720 (1977); Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977).
125.

Twombly, 550 U.S. at 544.

126. Until the Court recently decided American Needle, Inc. v. NFL, 130 S. Ct. 2201 (2010),
the last antitrust plaintiff's victory out of seventeen antitrust cases in the Supreme Court had been in
Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Services, 504 U.S. 451 (1992).
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ranging from predatory pricingl27 to vertical price restraints' and, of
course, to refusals to deal.129 Those are only examples, and the Court has
raised barriers to plaintiffs for numerous other kinds of antitrust claims as
well.O The point here is not to debate the merits of any of those particular
decisions, but to show that antitrust jurisprudence has evolved to reduce significantly the likelihood of false positives. The assumption that even more
preclusive rules against liability are necessary to protect against investment
deterrence and other costs of overenforcement requires more justification
than the Court has offered in light of these developments."3
The caselaw provides additional empirical evidence that the prospect of
false positives is not so great as to warrant the antitrust-precluding effect the
Court gives to competition-oriented regulation. There have been relatively
few successful claims of refusal-to-deal liability and the overall number of
cases has not been so great as to suggest the administrative and deterrence
costs of a rule-of-reason test will be higher than the benefits of such a rule.
Glen Robinson has shown that from 1980 to 2000, there were a total of 71
district and circuit court opinions addressing essential-facilities claims. '12
Although essential-facilities claims are a subset of refusal-to-deal claims,
they are a large subset and serve as a reasonable proxy for the volume of the
latter. In only 5 of 28 circuit court opinions and 6 of 43 district court opinions did the courts find there to be even a triable issue of fact as to the
existence of an essential facility.' 3 My update of the data shows that from
2001 to 2010 there were 22 circuit court opinions addressing essentialfacilities claims, of which only 3 found a triable issue on the merits."4 Those
3 include the Second Circuit's Trinko decision that the Supreme Court later
reversed. During that same recent period there were 56 district court cases
(distinct from the circuit court cases just mentioned) that dealt to differing
degrees with the essential-facilities doctrine, only 12 of which declined to
dispose of the claim on dismissal or summary judgment.

127.

See, e.g., Brooke Grp. v. Brown & Williamson, 509 U.S. 209 (1993).

128.

See, e.g., Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc. v. PSKS, Inc., 551 U.S. 877 (2007).

129.
(2004).

See, e.g., Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398

130.

See Stacey L. Dogan & Mark. A. Lemley, Antitrust Law and Regulatory Gaming, 87

TEx. L. REV. 685 (2009).

131. As Dogan and Lemley point out, the landscape of antitrust law has changed significantly
since Judge Frank Easterbrook's 1984 critique of antitrust law's propensity toward false positives.
Id. at 700 (discussing Frank H. Easterbrook, The Limits ofAntitrust, 63 TEXAs L. REv. 1 (1984)).
132. Glen 0. Robinson, On Refusing to Deal with Rivals, 87 CORNELL L. REv. 1177, 1207
n.129 (2002).
133.

Id.
134. To do this update, I followed Robinson's method of searching all federal court cases in
the LexisNexis database that expressly addressed "essential facilities." See id. To avoid double
counting, any district court case that was appealed was counted as an appellate case, and the district
court category contained only cases for which there was no subsequent opinion on appeal. See supra
note 84 for the reference to Robinson's method (search records on file with author).
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The case precedent therefore shows that even under the essentialfacilities approach the Court disdained in Trinko, courts have been able to
weed out the majority of cases and potential liability will not necessarily be
a broad deterrent to investment and innovation. To be sure, even the majority
of cases that ended with dismissal or summary judgment entailed costs for
defendants and the courts, although those costs are presumably much less
than what would have resulted from mistaken findings of liability. But the
overall number of essential-facilities cases, which I take as a proxy for the
broader universe of refusal-to-deal cases, has been modest. As precedent
develops, courts and plaintiffs gain increased guidance for the disposition of
future cases. To the extent specific factual circumstances (like those of Aspen) can be identified in which refusal-to-deal liability may be warranted,
those facts can become elements that constrain the rule-of-reason inquiry
and limit the incidence of false positives in enforcement. In sum, the caselaw does not on its face suggest such indiscriminate disposition by the
courts or such a large number of cases that the deterrent and other costs of
antitrust enforcement justify a presumptive preference for agency regulation
over judicial disposition.
The basis on which the Court elevated one form of government intervention over the other is therefore unclear. One possible answer is that antitrust
suits are more discretionary than regulation, and that while antitrust can adjust in light of regulation, the reverse may not be true depending on the
agency's obligations under the regulatory statute. This logic would provide a
rationale for presuming against novel antitrust theories that might interfere
with specific statutory provisions. It does not, however, provide a basis for
more broadly limiting strong antitrust enforcement on matters within a regulatory agency's jurisdiction where Congress has specifically provided
otherwise. The Court did not second-guess Congress's judgment about the
benefits of regulation under the 1996 act. Congress's inclusion of the antitrust savings clause suggests that Congress also determined the costs of
antitrust enforcement to be worthwhile in telecommunications markets. The
Court should have deferred here as it has in the past, where "Congress itself
expressed a willingness to bear the costs."135
2. Public Versus Private Antitrust Actions

Both Trinko and Credit Suisse involved private antitrust suits rather than
public enforcement actions by the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") or
the DOJ. The Supreme Court's decisions, however, affect public and private
actions equally. The Court nowhere confined its holdings to private cases
and antitrust doctrine draws no distinction between public and private enforcement. This is unfortunate because the Court's animating concerns
about costs are most salient in private suits while the benefits of antitrust
135. United States v. Winstar Corp., 518 U.S. 839, 883 (1996) (deferring to Congress on a
proposed costly regulation where Congress has assumed the costs associated with its implementation).
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law as a complement and substitute for regulation are likely to be greatest
through public enforcement. These differences arise because of differences
in the incentives and capabilities of public and private antitrust plaintiffs.
Phrased broadly, the Court's concern was that antitrust is always costly
and, in the presence of regulation, it is likely to have little additional benefit
for competition. Treble damages and class action litigation could make erroneous antitrust liability particularly costly in private cases. The
government, however, does not gain from using antitrust law against regulated firms unless doing so can yield net benefits on top of those the market
already gets through regulation. The federal antitrust agencies therefore
have stronger motivation than private plaintiffs do to assess the potential
costs of an antitrust case, identify the potential benefits that regulation will
not provide, and balance the two in the public interest.
The public antitrust authorities also have greater resources than private
plaintiffs to assess the costs and benefits of antitrust enforcement and to
avoid interfering with regulatory objectives. The FTC and DOJ can both
investigate private conduct through a variety of tools that can be focused on
specific conduct and information. These procedures are not costless, but
they can be narrowly tailored and they occur in advance of litigation, unlike
private discovery which occurs after litigation has been initiated and where
plaintiffs have incentives to be much less discriminating in the information
they demand from defendants.' Public antitrust agencies have greater ability and incentive to coordinate with relevant government regulatory agencies
to avoid conflicts and unnecessary administrative costs.
As a result, public antitrust enforcement is much more likely than private litigation to avoid claims that will be prone to judicial errors, interfere
with regulation, or fail to yield net benefits over regulation. Although the
rationales of Credit Suisse and Trinko apply more to private suits than public
enforcement, their precedent could have a preclusive effect on both.
II. Do TRINKO AND CREDIT SUISSE MAKE A DIFFERENCE?

To illustrate how Trinko and Credit Suisse have altered the relationship
between antitrust and regulation, consider an issue briefly mentioned in the
Introduction: whether the suit that led to the break-up of AT&T could be
brought today. The AT&T case is widely considered one of the U.S. government's most successful antitrust enforcement actions. The case began

136.
(2007).

See ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST

LAw,

FTC PRACTICE

AND PROCEDURE MANUAL

85-86

137. See Peter J. Jost, Disclosure of Information and Incentives for Care, 15 INT'L REv. L. &
EcON. 65, 65 (1995) ("Illf government officials act in the public interest, public administration is
best suited to compel the disclosure of private information [through discovery]."); Steven F.
Cherry & Gordon Pearson, Why Twombly Does (and Should) Apply to All Private Antitrust Actions, Including Alleged Hard-Core Cartels: A Reply to William J. Blechman, ANTITRUST
SOURCE (Dec. 2007), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/12/DecO7-Cherryl2-17.pdf
(distinguishing public enforcement from the "extraordinary costs" of private civil litigation).
138.

See

POSNER,

supra note 4, at 111; Bingaman, supra note 4.
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in 1974 when the DOJ filed suit under section 2 of the Sherman Act for,
among other things, AT&T's monopolization of the market for long-distance
telephone service; it ended in 1984 with the execution of a settlement that
broke AT&T's nearly century-old, integrated monopoly into seven separate
local telephone companies, an independent long-distance carrier, and an
independent equipment manufacturer.'
The DOJ filed its case in the midst of regulatory efforts by the FCC that
had also been aimed, though unsuccessfully, at getting AT&T to provide
potential competitors in the long-distance business the access to AT&T's
local-service customers that those rivals needed. Through a variety of strategies, AT&T had made such access either unavailable or available only on
burdensome, anticompetitive terms. As a result of the antitrust action that
forced the 1984 divestiture, AT&T lost both the incentive and ability to engage in such anticompetitive discrimination and consumers came to benefit
from lower prices and more innovative technology for long-distance calling.
The AT&T divestiture marked not only the most important development
in decades for telecommunications regulation, but also an event of great
importance for U.S. antitrust enforcement. While there remains much discussion about the costs and benefits of the Bell break-up and its subsequent
implementation, there is no doubt that the Modification of Final Judgment
(or "MFJ," as the consent decree has come to be known) fundamentally reconfigured the U.S. telecommunications market and set the course for
subsequent developments in legislation and industry structure. The MFJ
marked the end of a checkered history of efforts by the FCC to mediate
AT&T's discriminatory conduct toward competing long-distance and
equipment providers. For antitrust, the decree marked a success. The DOJ
had previously pursued AT&T for antitrust violations in 1912 and 1949 only
to obtain ineffectual settlements that did little to alter either AT&T's conduct
or its market power.140 In other large monopolization cases the DOJ had
similarly been unable to report recent victories. But on the same day the
DOJ announced it was withdrawing pursuit of its costly and inconclusive
investigation into alleged monopoly misconduct by IBM, it was able to announce a definitive result in its case against AT&T.141
Could the DOJ have sued AT&T if precedent that was equivalent to
Trinko had existed in 1974? Even under a narrow interpretation, Trinko's
presumption against antitrust in a regulated industry applies in the presence
of three elements: (1) a novel claim of monopolizing conduct; (2) a
139. United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (1982) (adopting a modified consent decree that
would go into effect two years later and discussing prior action in the case, including the original
1974 filing at note 18 and accompanying text).
140.

BENJAMIN ET AL.,

supra note 12, at 713.

141. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. at 138 n.17 (stating that January 8, 1982, was the date the government and AT&T announced settlement and mutually moved to dismiss the case); From Cave
Paintings to the Internet: A Chronological and Thematic Database, HISTORYOFSCIENCE.COM,
http://historyofscience.com/G21/timeline/index.php?id=1210 (last visited Nov. 11, 2010) (stating
that January 8, 1982, is the date the government announced its withdrawal of its antitrust suit against
IBM).
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regulatory statute that addresses the specific conduct underlying the antitrust
claim; and (3) active regulation of the activities at issue in the antitrust
claim. Each of those elements existed in Trinko's suit. As the following discussion shows, they also existed in the government's 1974 antitrust suit that
resulted ten years later in the break-up of AT&T.
Central to the DOJ's antitrust suit were AT&T's relationships with its
would-be competitors and the company's conduct in preventing those rivals
from challenging AT&T's monopoly in any area of U.S. telecommunications.14 2 Pursuant to its authority under the Communications Act of 1934, the
FCC itself had already been directly involved in mediating those same competitive relationships for over twenty-five years by the time the DOJ filed
the 1974 antitrust suit that culminated in the Bell break-up. In 1947, for example, the commission ruled that AT&T could not bar subscribers from
using non-AT&T recording devices in conjunction with their AT&T phone
service.143 Several years later, however, the FCC allowed AT&T to prohibit
customers from using the "Jordaphone," a more sophisticated device that not
only recorded phone calls the subscriber had answered but that itself answered those calls mechanically (like a modern answering machine does)
and therefore could supposedly harm the network in ways the earlier recording devices could not.
After an embarrassing decision (subsequently reversed by an appellate
court) in the famed Hush-a-Phonecase, in which the FCC allowed AT&T to
bar customers from using a simple, snap-on sound-dampening device that
enabled people to speak more privately in crowded environments, the commission became more aggressive in its policing of AT&T's dealings with
competitors.145 In 1968, the FCC rejected AT&T's effort to block use of the
Carterfone, a device that interconnected mobile radios (of the kind then used
by police departments and taxi fleets) to the telephone network and ruled
that absent proof of harm to the network or to AT&T's operations, any device could be attached to the telephone network.146 To be sure, Carterfone
was not the end of AT&T's wrangling with its equipment competitors or
with the FCC over those competitive relationships. "' The details of those
interactions are not relevant for current purposes; what is relevant is the fact
that the FCC was exercising active regulatory oversight over AT&T's relationships with its competitors in the years leading up to the DOJ's antitrust
suit against Bell.
At the heart of the AT&T divestiture was competition in long-distance
telephone service. Here, too, the FCC had been directly involved in AT&T's
supra note 12, at 723.

142.

AT&T, 552 F. Supp at 131;

143.

Use of Recording Devices in Connection with Tel. Serv., 11 F.C.C. 1033 (1947).

144.

Jordaphone Corp. of Am., 18 F.C.C. 644 (1954).

BENJAMIN ET AL.,

145. Hush-A-Phone Corp., 20 F.C.C. 391 (1955), rev'd Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States,
238 F.2d 266 (D.C. Cir. 1956).
146. Use of the Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., 13 F.C.C. 2d 420 (1968).
AL.,

147. See, e.g., Phonotele, Inc. v. AT&T, 664 F.2d 716 (9th Cir. 1981); see also, BENJAMIN,
supra note 12, at 716-17.
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dealings with its soon-to-be competitors. Indeed, the FCC sparked the rise
of competitive interexchange service by authorizing use of microwave technology to provide private transmission of interstate communications."4
Eventually, the FCC allowed more kinds of commercial long-distance competition to develop. In 1969, the commission authorized construction of a
competing commercial service providing long-distance calling between Chicago and St. Louis,14 9 and in 1971 the agency more broadly permitted
commercial entry by specialized long-distance carriers that competed with
AT&T to carry traffic for large businesses. "o In 1974, the same year both the
government and MCI filed antitrust suits against AT&T, the FCC required
AT&T to file tariffs under which Bell would make its local networks available for interconnection with competing long-distance networks."' Notably,
the FCC order came seven months before the government filed its suit.152
The FCC issued its order several weeks after MCI filed its private action
against AT&T,'53 but the regulatory proceedings that led to the order had
been underway long before MCI went to court.54 There was much wrangling before the commission and the courts over the details of AT&T's
tariffs and its compliance with them, but there is again little question that the
FCC was directly involved in regulating precisely the relationships between
AT&T and new long-distance market entrants that were the subject of the
private and public antitrust suits.
There remains the question of whether those antitrust suits involved
claims that were novel and would therefore trigger Trinko's bar against expansion of antitrust liability in the presence of regulation. Had the
government not broken up AT&T in 1984 and were it bringing its suit today,
the claims would be just as novel as Trinko's claim was. The refusal-to-deal
claims in the government's 1974 suit look quite aggressive when considered
restrospectively through the lens of Trinko. As the Trinko Court interpreted
the 1985 Aspen case, it marked an exception to a long-standing reluctance in
American antitrust law to impose unilateral duties to deal. 5 In the Court's
recounting, Aspen marked an expansion of section 2 liability the year after
See Allocation of Frequencies in the Bands Above 890 Mc., 27 F.C.C. 359 (1959).
149. Applications of Microwave Comm., Inc. for Constr. Permits to Establish New Facilities
in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Radio Servs., 18 FC.C. Rcd 2d 953 (1969).
148.

150. Establisent of Policies and Procedures for Consideration of Applications to Provide
Specialized Common Carrier Serv. in the Domestic Pub. Point-to-Point Microwave Servs., 29 FC.C.
2d 870 (1971).
151. Bell Sys. Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by Other Common
Carriers, 46 F.C.C. 2d 413 (1974).
152. The FCC's order issued on April 23, 1974, id., and the government filed its lawsuit on
November 20, 1974, see AT&T v. Grady, 594 F2d 594 (7th Cir. 1979).
153. MCI filed its suit on March 6, 1974. MCI Comm. Corp. v. AT&T, 462 F Supp. 1072
(N.D. Ill. 1978).
154. See Bell Sys. Tariff Offerings of Local Distribution Facilities for Use by Other Common
Carriers, 46 F.C.C. 2d 413.
155. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, 540 U.S. 398, 409-10
(2004).
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the divestiture, suggesting that the latter occurred when antitrust law had yet
fewer exceptions to the presumption against duties to deal with competitors
and the government's theory of liability was even more novel. There are
good grounds for debate over how novel Aspen really was in 1985 and about
the historical movement of the outer bounds of section 2 liability. There is
little doubt, however, that the government's claims against AT&T, as well as
MCI's successful private suit against the carrier, were novel from Trinko's
perspective on then-existing antitrust doctrine.
The antitrust suit that brought about AT&T's divestiture thus has the
three important attributes that led the Supreme Court to dismiss Trinko's
claims: (1) a novel or "outer boundary" antitrust claim, (2) a statute that
gives the regulatory agency authority to regulate conduct related to economic competition, and (3) active regulation by the agency of precisely the
monopolizing conduct at issue in the government's antitrust suit. AT&T,
Otter Tail, Silver, and other cases show that the government and private
plaintiffs could bring such cases twenty-five or thirty years ago, with the
courts denying implied immunity from the private antitrust suits under statutes that lacked an antitrust savings clause. That today there are substantial
barriers to such cases even when there is an express statutory provision to
save antitrust demonstrates the far-reaching implications of Trinko and Credit Suisse for the relationship between antitrust and regulation. The
consequences are particularly important for public antitrust agencies like the
FTC and the Antitrust Division of the DOJ, which have the discretion, investigatory authority, and expertise to mitigate the presumed costs and risks of
antitrust enforcement that motivated the Court, but whose ability to bring
cases is just as affected by Trinko and Credit Suisse as that of private plaintiffs.
III.

CONSEQUENCES FOR THE BALANCE BETWEEN
ANTITRUST AND REGULATION

In many cases, the practical effect of Trinko and Credit Suisse will be to
impose a reasonable limitation on conceptually weak antitrust claims where
regulation specifically addresses the conduct at issue. There are important
circumstances, however, in which the effects of those cases will not be so
modest and will lead to unintended, harmful consequences. The potential
harm will arise because Trinko and Credit Suisse will also limit antitrust
law's ability to complement regulation where the latter has gaps in coverage
or effectiveness (as in the AT&T divestiture case); those cases will limit antitrust in substituting for regulation where antitrust would be a more targeted
and less costly means of competition enforcement.

156. The FCC had acknowledged that its regulation had been ineffective in preventing the
conduct at issue in the government's antitrust suit against AT&T. United States v. AT&T, 552 F.
Supp. 131, 168 (D.D.C. 1982). But the same might be said anytime harmful conduct occurs notwithstanding active regulation, for had the regulation prevented the conduct there would be no
grounds for the antitrust suit.
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Contrary to the Court's presumption,17 in many cases regulation will be
more costly than either antitrust enforcement or a combination of antitrust
and regulation would be. In the words of Justice (then Judge) Breyer,
"[A]ntitrust is not another form of regulation. Antitrust is an alternative to
regulation and, where feasible, a better alternative."' Of course, if Congress
requires an agency to regulate, policymakers cannot choose antitrust as an
alternative. But antitrust might still be a beneficial supplement even if it is
not a full substitute; and in the far more usual case where agencies have
some discretion in the promulgation and enforcement of regulations, the
comparative benefits of antitrust as a substitute become important. Even if
regulators have authority to regulate, they may decide that forbearance from
"gearing up the cumbersome, highly imperfect bureaucratic apparatus of
classical regulation" in favor of antitrust enforcement will be the better policy choice.'"9 This will be a particularly important option as economic
conditions in the regulated industry change. The case-by-case approach of
antitrust enforcement, which targets specific instances of anticompetitive
conduct as they arise, can usually deal with unique or unexpected factual
situations better than can regulatory rulemaking, which depends more on
specifying competitive obligations and prohibitions prospectively, in advance of actual conduct. After Trinko and Credit Suisse, however, statutory
authority to regulate has become a greater potential barrier to antitrust law
as a substitute for regulation.
This Part begins by discussing the costs and benefits of regulation and
then explains why the comparative costs and benefits of antitrust change as
an industry moves from monopoly toward competition. It argues that the
benefits of regulation diminish as markets become competitive while the
costs of regulation remain and even increase as that transition occurs. Regulatory costs that might result in a net benefit in the presence of monopoly
become less likely to do so as a market moves away from a concentrated
structure. This change in the relative costs and benefits of regulation has
implications for the socially desirable balance between antitrust and regulation and, in turn, shows how Trinko and Credit Suisse may require
administrative agencies to make inefficient choices between underregulation
and overregulation.
A. The Costs and Benefits of Regulation

Economic regulation typically arises because there is some reason that
competition is either undesirable or unattainable in a market. Natural
monopoly, where it costs less to have one firm serve the entire market than

157. William E. Kovacic & Marc Winerman, Competition Policy and the Application of Section 5 of the FederalTrade Commission Act, 76 ANTITRUST L. J. 929, 938-39 (2010).
158. Stephen G. Breyer, Antitrust, Deregulation, and the Newly Liberated Marketplace, 75
CALIF. L. REv. 1005, 1007 (1987) (emphasis omitted).
159.

Id.
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to have multiple firms competing to do so, is a prominent example.6 In
such cases, the regulator's main job is to ensure that the monopolist meets
its service obligations without extracting monopoly profits from consumers.
In other settings, regulators might want to keep multiple firms in the market
but allow them to cooperate to overcome certain market failures. Thus,
securities regulators might want to let underwriters cooperate in gathering
broad information on the potential retail market for securities a firm plans to
issue in the future, but at the same time use regulatory oversight to mitigate
the scope and harmful effects of collusive pricing that might result from
such cooperation in the concentrated securities underwriting market.6' As a
final example, regulators might oversee the development of competition in
historically monopoly markets. In such cases, the job of the agency may
involve establishing conditions on which competitive entrants can gain
access and interconnection to the incumbent monopolist's customers and
facilities. 62
Whatever the particular form economic regulation takes, its potential
costs have numerous causes: information asymmetries, regulatory capture,
incentive distortions, and a host of other ills have long been the subject of
substantial commentary and concern from policymakers, firms, and researchers. The kinds of regulation at issue in Trinko and Credit Suisse are
variants of common forms of economic regulation. The regulation at issue in
Trinko involved access rules and decisions about what pieces of incumbent
networks competitors should be able to use, and at what price. At issue in
Credit Suisse was the SEC's oversight of the process by which syndicates of
securities underwriters collectively work out the retail price and quantity of
securities that members of the syndicate would sell to investors. A more
general discussion of pricing and access regulation can help shed light on
the cost-benefit assumptions underlying Trinko and Credit Suisse and on
potential policy consequences of those cases.
1. Price Regulation

In the presence of natural monopoly, distributional objectives, or other
circumstances in which an unregulated market will not work well, the gov160.

For a discussion of natural monopoly, see

BENJAMIN ET AL.,

supra note 12, at 444-49.

161. See U.S. Underwriter and Fee Information, GERARD HOBERG'S HOMEPAGE, http://
www.rhsmith.umd.edu/faculty/ghoberg/byuw.html (showing data complied by Thompson Financial).
162. This is the purpose of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its mandate to the FCC,
but telecommunications is not unique. For example, similar facilitation of competition occurs in
pharmaceutical regulation, pursuant to the Hatch-Waxman Act, 21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2006), and under
the Federal Power Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 791a-828c (2006).
163. See, e.g., HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICs 588 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing moral hazard and other regulatory difficulties); Harvey Averch & Leland Johnson, Behavior of
the Firm Under Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. EcON. REV. 1052 (1962) (fundamental article on
incentive distortions for regulated firms); George J. Stigler, The theory of economic regulation, 2
BELL J. EcON. & MGMT. Sc. 3 (1971) (a classic discussion of regulatory capture).
164.

See the detailed discussions of Trinko and Credit Suisse in Part I supra.
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ernment may decide to intervene to control prices. In principle, this price
regulation can be socially beneficial. Limits on monopoly pricing can protect consumers from the absence of competition; mandated differential
pricing to commercial and residential consumers can ensure cross-subsidies
that enable poorer households to afford electricity or communications services; and common carriage rules can ensure that firms of various kinds
cannot discriminate by charging differing prices to different customers. In
practice, however, achieving long-term benefits of any kind through price
regulation is hard and should be tried only when markets will likely fail to
achieve society's objectives. Again, as put by Justice Breyer, "Regulation is
viewed as a substitute for competition, to be used only as a weapon of last
resort-as a heroic cure reserved for a serious disease."
Regulators have long recognized the difficulties of price regulation, difficulties that apply whether wholesale or retail prices are at issue.'6 One
threshold problem with determining "reasonable" terms for sale of a product
or service is that the information necessary for the relevant calculations is in
the hands of the very companies being regulated. Moral hazard problems
thus arise because a firm can affect a regulatory agency's determination of
allowable terms by manipulating underlying accounting data.'67 Even in
cases where regulators can resolve such information asymmetries and obtain
accurate cost data and other relevant market information, retail regulation
raises several perplexing problems. Regulators must figure out which costs
the seller may pass on to buyers with a mark-up that allows the seller a positive return, which costs the seller may pass on to buyers without any markup, and which costs the seller may not pass on at all. Typically, regulators
allow firms to earn a return on things like expenditures on physical capital
and the costs of financing the firms' operations,169 but not, for example,70 on
executive pay bonuses or investments that regulators deem "imprudent.,,
The last category of costs can be particularly contentious and involve
protracted regulatory proceedings. It can also raise some of the very potential for investment disincentives that the Court ascribed to antitrust
enforcement in Trinko. For example, the California Public Utilities Commission excluded from the rate base nearly 80 percent of the costs Pacific
Gas & Electric incurred in building the Diablo Canyon Nuclear Power Plant
because it believed that "unreasonable management was to blame for a large

165.
166.
(1988).
167.

Breyer, supra note 158, at 1007.
See, e.g., Policy and Rules Concerning Rates for Dominant Carriers, 3 FCC Rcd. 3195
See, e.g.,

VARIAN,

supra note 163, at 609.

See 4 FCC Red. 2873, 2883-84 (1989); see also W. Kip VISCUSI
OF REGULATION AND ANTITRUST 381 (2d ed. 1995).
168.

169.
170.
costs).

47 U.S.C. §§ 213, 220 (2006); see also VISCUSI

ET AL.,

ET AL., THE EcONOMICS

supra note 168, at 381-82.

See 4 FCC Red. at 2884 (describing an investigation into Bell System's accounting of
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part of [the] cost overrun."' 7' While that particular decision and others like it
protect consumers from bearing costs that dominant firms could not pass
through if they faced competition, regulators must be careful about punishing a firm for decisions that were well-founded when made but later turned
out badly. Mistaken or politically motivated hindsight could have as strong a
deterrent effect on innovation incentives as could unwarranted antitrust liability.
Putting aside the difficulties of assessing a firm's costs for purposes of
determining a "rate base" on which to calculate a firm's allowable return
from its regulated sales, regulators face the challenge of how to value that
rate base. As a general matter, regulators try to meet constitutional requirements by allowing a return on the "fair value" of a utility's assets.172 The
principle of the fair value measure is to allow return on those investments
that have resulted in productive facilities and to disallow return on investments that have failed to produce beneficial assets for the firm.1'7 Another
way to frame the fair value approach is to ask what the current market value
of relevant assets would be, were they hypothetically to be sold-a determination the Supreme Court has called a "laborious and baffling task." 7 4
2. Access Regulation

The Telecommunications Act of 1996 tries to foster competition in U.S.
telecommunications markets by allowing new entrants to have access to the
infrastructure of incumbent firms. In this respect, the statute was part of a
broader evolution in regulatory policy away from conduct and pricing rules
designed to control monopoly power and toward rules designed to speed the
growth of competition and eliminate or reduce the need for costly economic
regulation in the future.
The 1996 act charges the FCC with identifying the parts of the incumbent networks to which new entrants should have such access and at what
prices, the very regulation at issue in Trinko. The difficulty with the first
step was in distinguishing network facilities that new entrants could not
economically provide for themselves from facilities entrants could obtain
from sources other than the incumbent. Too lax an access rule would create
disincentives for entrants or third parties to invest in building competing
infrastructure and deprive consumers of the competition and innovation such
investment could bring. Too strict an access rule would prevent potential

171.
13 (1987).
172.

STATE OF CALIFORNIA, PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION ANNUAL REPORT

1986-1987,

at

See Smyth v. Ames, 169 U.S. 466, 467 (1898).

173. See Fed. Power Comm'n v. Natural Gas Pipeline, 315 U.S. 575, 604-05 (1942); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 309 (1989).
174. Missouri ex rel. Sw. Bell Tel. Co. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 262 U.S. 276, 292 (1923).
175. See Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great Transformation of Regulated
Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323 (1998).
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entrants from gaining a foothold in the telecommunications market and defeat the act's purpose.
The FCC's challenge in drawing up a list of incumbent facilities to
which new firms would have access was fraught with many of the same difficulties found in price regulation: information asymmetries, moral hazard,
the identification of relevant costs, and so on. But in the case of access regulation the problem was to some degree magnified because the commission
needed detailed information not just about the incumbent firms' costs but
also about the costs and technologies of the competitive entrants and of potential third-party providers of telecommunications facilities. This proved to
be a tall order for the FCC, if the agency's record before the courts is an
indicator of success; it took the FCC four rulemaking proceedings over
176
nearly ten years to issue an unbundling order that finally held up in court,
lending some irony to Trinko's skepticism about the ability of antitrust enforcement to be adequately discriminating about refusal-to-deal liability for
incumbent telephone companies. In 1999 the Supreme Court itself struck
down the FCC's first attempt at unbundling rules as overbroad and devoid of
a limiting principle.1
With respect to prices, the 1996 act prescribes rates for parts of the network to which the FCC grants entrants access-known as unbundled
network elements ("UNEs")--that are based on cost.' To avoid building
historical inefficiencies of the monopoly network into the rate base, the FCC
determined that the relevant costs for setting UNE rates should not be based
on what the firm actually spent to build its network in the past. Instead, the
cost base should be no higher than what it would cost to buy the firm's network technology in the current market." 9 The idea was that new entrants
should have to pay only what the technology is worth today, not the potentially higher amount it actually cost to build historically. Properly
implemented, this approach requires calculating the forward-looking economic value of each element of a network. This calculation resembles the
fair-value approach already discussed, with all of its attendant difficulties.
After several years of experience trying to set UNE rates based on
forward-looking cost and successfully defending the rate setting mechanism in court, the FCC declared the enterprise to be counterproductive.
First, the commission found that the pricing rules "have proven to take a
great deal of time and effort to implement.

. ..

The drain on resources for

supra note 12, at 823.
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178. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 252 (2006). Section 251 explains the obligations of incumbent providers to provide competitors with access to their networks while § 252 explains the terms and
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e.g., Covad Commc'ns Co. v. BellSouth Corp., 314 F.3d 1282, n.5 (1 Ith Cir. 2002).
179. See 47 C.F.R. § 51.505 (2009). The FCC called its pricing rule the "TELRIC" method;
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180.
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the state commissions and interested parties can be tremendous."'8' The
FCC further observed that "these complicated and time-consuming proceedings may work to divert scarce resources from carriers that otherwise would
use those resources to compete in local markets."' Second, the commission
found the costly proceedings to produce inconsistent results:
[F]or any given carrier there may be significant differences in rates from
state to state, and even from proceeding to proceeding within a state. We
are concerned that such variable results may not reflect genuine cost differences but instead may be the product of the complexity of the issues, the
very general nature of our rules, and uncertainty about how to apply those
rules.'
Finally, the FCC found that "[t]he lack of predictability in UNE rates is difficult to reconcile with our desire that UNE prices send correct economic
signals."'84 As the commission's observation about incorrect economic signals indicates, the rate-setting function of monopoly regulation is costly not
only in its administrative burdens, but in its effects on economic incentives
of market participants.
The FCC example shows that one cannot presume that regulatory processes are more accurate or efficient than antitrust. Just as mistaken antitrust
enforcement can deter innovation or other beneficial conduct, regulatory
errors can be costly to consumers and the regulated firm alike. If regulators
set rates too high, then price regulation is not protecting consumers very
well, yet is still incurring administrative costs and distorting incentives.
Consumers might be better off with competition that, although perhaps less
efficient from a cost standpoint, does a better job of disciplining pricing behavior. If, on the other hand, regulators set prices too low, then the regulated
firm might have trouble attracting the financial investment necessary to
maintain, develop, and deploy capital in the way that best benefits consumers in the long run.
Even if one assumes there is no industry capture and no political or economic distortion of individual regulators' incentives, regulation is unlikely
to be error-free. Just like errors in antitrust enforcement, regulatory errors
have potentially serious consequences for consumer welfare and firms' incentives. There are likely to be substantial costs incurred through agency
oversight and firms' compliance with regulation as well. There thus seems
little basis to presume, as the Court appears implicitly to do in Trinko, that
the costs of regulation are of lesser concern than are the costs of antitrust
enforcement. There are, however, reasons why the costs of regulation relaReview of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements
181.
and the Resale of Serv. by Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, 18 FCC Rcd. 18945, 18948-49 (2003)
(notice of proposed rulemaking).
182.

Id. at 18949.

183.
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184.
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185.
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tive to those of antitrust are likely to rise as an industry moves from the concentrated structures that originally motivated regulation to competition.
B. Why Regulation Gets Harderas Competition Develops

As competition develops in a regulated industry, regulators face new
challenges on top of the difficulties discussed above. The conundrum for
regulatory agencies and Congress is that regulation is likely to become more
difficult before the industry's evolution to competition is sufficiently developed for a laissez-faire approach to serve consumer welfare. The problem is
particularly complex where, as in telecommunications, the growth of competition may for a time depend on the very regulations that are becoming
harder for the FCC to implement successfully.
To illustrate, suppose regulators want to protect buyers from a monopolist's exercise of its market power and allow the seller only a "fair" or
competitive rate of return on its sales. Mistakes in setting the rates could
either deliver consumers too little benefit compared to monopoly pricing (if
the regulated rate is too high) or deter efficient levels of investment by the
regulated firm (if the regulated rates are too low). In either case, it is still
possible for the regulated rates to improve both consumer welfare and total
welfare. If the regulated prices are lower than those the monopolist would
charge unconstrained, then the buyers are still better off even if the regulator
overshoots the fair-return benchmark. If the regulated prices are too low,
then consumers will at least temporarily gain through lower prices and the
regulated firm can seek redress through a new rate tariff.
The emergence of competition in regulated markets increases both the
likelihood of rate-setting errors and their potential costs because the rate
affects not just consumer surplus and incumbent carriers' decisions, but the
incentives of the new entrants as well. Competitive entry has important welfare consequences for consumers who would benefit from the competition
and innovation it could yield. If regulators set prices too low, potential entrants will stay out of the market. This is particularly true when firms must
make large, fixed investments in infrastructure to provide service. In regulating the incumbent's rates, therefore, regulators in a market undergoing
transition to competition must also consider whether the rates provide the
return competitors need to attract investment and profitably enter the market; new entrants will not be able to attract customers if they set prices
above the incumbent's rate. In their efforts to restrain a dominant firm's perceived market power, regulators risk deterring the competitive entry that
could improve long-run consumer welfare and ultimately obviate the need
for regulation at all.
Regulated prices that are too high can also cause harm, although differently and less predictably than undercompensatory prices. There is evidence
that under some conditions regulated prices that are above those that would
have emerged from unregulated competition among the incumbent and the
new entrants can act as focal points around which market prices cluster.
That is, even if the regulated firm has downward pricing flexibility, prices
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may be higher than in an unregulated setting if the incumbent must file tariffs that give advance notice of its intention to lower prices. As the Supreme
Court noted in Albrecht v. Herald, when competition emerges that would
drive prices down toward cost, a scheme setting maximum prices "tends to
acquire all the attributes of an arrangement fixing minimum prices."16 Empirical data suggest that rate regulation in the long-distance telephone
market for several years kept rates higher than they would have been in the
absence of price regulation.17
Similar concerns arise with regulation of the rates competitive entrants
pay for access to elements of incumbent facilities-e.g., rail tracks, pipelines, or telephone lines-in a regulated market. If regulated access rates are
too high then they do not facilitate efficient entry and are therefore not
worth their administrative costs. Access rates that are too low can deter an
incumbent from investing in its network and deter entrants from building
their own networks by providing them with subsidized use of the incumbent's network.' Underpriced access for competitors may in fact create
disincentives for the most desirable entrants from coming into the market.
An entrant with beneficial new technology might not deploy its innovation if
artificially low (i.e., below an appropriate measure of cost) access rates allow less efficient entrants to use incumbent facilities to enter the market.
Such inefficient entry can drive up the cost of capital for desirable (i.e., efficient and innovative) entrants by increasing the latter's competitive risks and
driving down the returns from their innovative investments. The result may
be less investment by incumbents and entrants alike, less innovation, and
less price competition over time for consumers.
Regulators must therefore walk a fine line in markets in which competition is emerging: they must set rates at a level high enough to allow an
efficient firm to attract the investment necessary to compete in the marketplace, but not so high as to create a de facto, noncompetitive price floor.
Rates above the targeted level will make consumers worse off than they
would be in an unregulated market; rates below that level could deter competition that would naturally lower prices and obviate the need for
administratively costly regulation. Given the difficulties that regulators inevitably face in setting rates with such precision, one must be skeptical
about the wisdom of importing rate-regulation schemes from a monopoly
setting into an emerging competitive environment.
The discussion above highlights several points for understanding the
comparative purposes and advantages of antitrust and regulation. First, regulation is neither costless nor necessarily beneficial and, more importantly, is

186. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 153 (1968). The Court overruled Albrecht's per se
rule against maximum price fixing in State Oil Co. v. Khan, 522 U.S. 3 (1997), as the harm from
maximum prices could not be as conclusively presumed as the harm from minimum price fixing.
187. Paul W. MacAvoy, Testing for Competitiveness of Markets for Long Distance Telephone
Services: Competition Finally?, 13 REV. INDUS. ORG. 295, 298, 305 (1998).
188. Review of the Comm'n's Rules Regarding the Pricing of Unbundled Network Elements
and the Resale of Serv. by Incumbent Local Exch. Carriers, 18 FCC Red. 18945, 18947 (2003).
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not presumptively more efficient than antitrust enforcement. Second, the
comparative benefits of antitrust and regulation vary with market conditions.
The benefits of price and access regulation depend largely on the existence
of some reason, like natural monopoly, that competition cannot or should
not exist. In monopoly, rates that are too low do not by definition distort
competition, and rates that are too high relative to a competitive benchmark
may still be better than what the monopolist (or regulated syndicate, as in
Credit Suisse) would charge unconstrained. Monopoly thus allows regulation to be imprecise and still create consumer benefits. Under competition,
especially emerging competition, regulators have much less margin for error. The errors and administrative costs that may still be compatible with net
social gains under regulated monopoly become less so as competition develops. Rather than restraining the significant harms of monopoly,
regulation risks impeding the greater benefits of competition.
C. Antitrust as a Substitutefor Regulation

When changes in technology, consumer preferences, or other market
conditions alter or weaken the rationale for regulation, changes and the
means and objectives of regulatory agencies are likely to follow. Harm to
consumers through the exercise of monopoly power may diminish in magnitude while harm to consumers through anticompetitive conduct, either in
collusion with or against emerging competitors, becomes an increasing
concern. Rules that specify or limit conduct as a whole ex ante may give
rise to standards for judging conduct on a case-by-case basis ex post. But
this transition may leave regulators with the challenge of managing potential gaps in market oversight. Leaving a market with a dominant player
and emerging entrants to its own competitive devices might work in some
settings, but in others it will allow the dominant firm to maintain its market position and exclude rivals. Some regulatory statutes may give
agencies the authority to intervene in a more targeted way to punish or
enjoin anticompetitive behavior ex post, thereby freeing the agency to
eliminate costly ex ante rules without losing regulatory leverage altogether. But often such authority will not exist or, in the case of the
Communications Act, be ambiguous at best.' 9 The natural backstop at
such a point is antitrust enforcement.
The availability of antitrust to substitute for regulation during such transitional phases, which may last for years, is what Trinko and Credit Suisse
diminish. The regulatory statute will likely remain in force during periods of
transition to competition.'" Congress may have little interest in deregulating
189. Formal Complaint of Free Press and Public Knowledge Against Comcast Corporation for
Secretly Degrading Peer-to-Peer Applications, FCC WC Docket #07-52 (Aug. 1, 2008)
(memorandum opinion and order), available at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/
FCC-08-183Al.pdf.
190. See, e.g., Charles H. Fine & John M. de Figueiredo, Can We Avoid Repeating the Mistakes of the Past in Telecommunications Regulatory Reform? (MIT Communications Futures
Program, Working Paper 2005-001, 2005), available at http://www.freedomworks.org/reports/
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before competition is well-developed, so the economic structure of a market
in transition is unlikely to invite statutory repeal.' 9 ' Depending on how the
agency has implemented regulation, new entrants or incumbents may also
want to retain regulation during transitional periods because it either reduces
the costs of entry or the consequences of competition. Regulation will therefore often remain on the books even if the regulatory agency makes a
reasoned finding that exercise of its regulatory authority will be unhelpful
and decides it would be better to forebear to the extent it has discretion to do
so. It is at this point, when antitrust enforcement would be most useful as a
complement or substitute for regulation in the evolving market, that the limits Trinko and Credit Suisse impose on antitrust claims could be most costly.
The fact that Trinko purported to bar only novel claims does not substantially mitigate the potential for antitrust gaps in settings where regulation
becomes less likely to yield benefits. First, as discussed above, the line between novel and established antitrust liability theories may be hard to
maintain. Second, as regulated industries evolve they may be especially
likely to give rise to factually novel circumstances. New, more competitive
market structures often arise from technological innovation or shifting patterns of consumer demand.192 In such dynamic settings, familiar assumptions
about the consequences of various kinds of economic conduct in the marketplace may not hold. The same refusal-to-deal, product tie, or exclusive
dealing arrangement that looked competitively benign might, in the changing market, produce unacceptably anticompetitive results. Yet the evolving
marketplace will at the same time make the effects of ex ante conduct rules
less predictable, rendering prospective conduct regulation more difficult. In
such cases, the availability of antitrust enforcement allows regulation to
diminish without leaving a gap in oversight of competitive conduct in the
relevant markets.
Especially where Congress has not granted immunity from antitrust law
or, as in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, has expressly preserved it,
there is no reason to think that Congress intends regulation alone to address
the novel competitive circumstances that evolving regulated markets may
present. Economic conditions in a regulated industry might for a time require Congress to establish "the kinds of affirmative duties . .. [that] do not
081205.pdf. The authors discuss delays in deregulating airlines, natural gas, banking, railroad
freight, and mobile telephone service and examine the welfare costs of those delays. Another example is the FCC's slow deregulation of AT&T as a dominant long-distance carrier, which did not
occur until more than a decade after the Bell system divestiture and long after vigorous competition
had developed in the long-distance telephone service market. Motion of AT&T to be Reclassified as
a Non-Dominant Carrier, 11 FCC Rcd. 3271 (1995) (Order); see also Albert A. Foer & Diana L.
Moss, Electricity in Transition: Implications for Regulation and Antitrust, 24 ENERGY L.J. 89
(2003) (discussing the transition to competition in electric power and the role antitrust might play).
See Fine & de Figueiredo, supra note 190.
192. One example of the former is microgeneration in the electricity industry, allowing
smaller plants to achieve sufficient scale and contest the market for generated power against
conventional utility monopolies. An example of the latter is the shifting consumer preference
away from conventional wire-line telephone service and toward mobile, wireless service. See
Howard A. Shelanski, Adjusting Regulation to Competition: Toward a New Model for U.S. Tele191.

communications Policy, 24 YALE J. ON REG. 55 (2007).
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exist under the unadorned antitrust laws."'93 As conditions in the market become more competitive, regulation may become inefficient or
counterproductive even while the market retains some risk of the failures
that spurred Congress to authorize regulation. Antitrust enforcement might
offer a less costly way to meet those risks, but in industries unique enough
to have attracted Congress's attention, the facts of a particular antitrust case
may not fit squarely within the bounds of clearly established doctrine even if
they might otherwise present a compelling basis for section 2 liability.
Evolving market conditions will not always limit agencies to a choice
between costly regulation and inadequate competition enforcement. When
they do impose such a choice, however, they impede a more efficient transition to competition that could have large consumer-welfare benefits,
especially in major regulated sectors like energy and telecommunications
that affect virtually every household. The loss or delay of those benefits and
the removal of antitrust as a factor agencies can take into account in determining how they regulate are thus unfortunate and potentially costly
consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse. The emphasis in those cases on
redundancy and incompatibility between antitrust and regulation obscures
the fact that antitrust may be a complement or substitute for regulation that
regulators will wish to take into account in deciding on the nature and extent
of their rules.19 4 The presence of an antitrust savings clause can be read to
expressly recognize this relationship between antitrust and regulatory decision making. There is no doubt that in some cases antitrust enforcement is
so costly that it should be avoided, but the effort to limit those costs should
not leave in place a yet less efficient and more costly set of regulatory options.

IV. ALTERNATIVE

SOLUTIONS TO BALANCING

ANTITRUST AND REGULATION

The more broadly courts interpret Trinko and Credit Suisse to preclude
antitrust claims, the greater the gap in competition regulation is likely to be
as industry structure evolves and the less-inclined agencies will be to repeal
costly rules. The situation is exacerbated in industries, like electric power,
whose statute contains no antitrust savings clause and in which immunity
could sweep especially broadly under Credit Suisse. There are a variety of
ways that the harmful consequences of Trinko and Credit Suisse could be
mitigated. The challenge is in overcoming the overbroad removal of antitrust from the regulatory balance while still preserving the beneficial aspects
of those cases.

193.

Goldwasser v. Ameritech Corp., 222 F3d 390, 400 (7th Cir. 2000).

194. As just one example of where an agency has withdrawn regulation partly in reliance on
antitrust to fill the gap, see the discussion of the FCC's withdrawal of some of its media ownership
rules in 2003. See Howard A. Shelanski, Antitrust Law as Mass-Media Regulation: Can Merger
Standards Protect the Public Interest?, 94 CALIF. L. REv. 371 (2006).
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One possibility is that some lower federal courts will interpret Trinko
and Credit Suisse narrowly. As mentioned in Part I, Trinko left open the
questions of how closely regulation must address the conduct underlying an
antitrust claim and how actively the regulatory supervision must be to trigger preclusion of an antitrust claim. The higher the standard lower courts
apply, the fewer the antitrust claims they will block. Similarly, lower courts
could take a very narrow view of what constitutes "expansion" of existing
antitrust law or of what claims are likely to confuse district courts, and reduce the scope of implied immunity in that way. Such decisions would lead
to less immunity from antitrust for regulated firms in those jurisdictions. If
enough diversity developed among the federal courts, the Supreme Court
might at some point revisit and refine their balance between antitrust and
regulation.
Another possibility would be for Congress (or the Supreme Court in a
future case) to establish clearer standards for antitrust immunity and to assign the case-by-case immunity determination to district courts. This is the
position the solicitor general's office took in Credit Suisse, essentially asking the court to clarify its standard of incompatibility between antitrust and
regulation and to let district courts decide which cases met that standard.'
As discussed, the Court believed the line-drawing problem to be too difficult
for courts and decided to err in favor of precluding valid claims rather than
to allow claims that should have been barred by the regulation. From a judicial economy and consistency perspective, the solicitor general's proposed
solution would be costlier than the Court's immunity approach, but it would
also preserve the benefits of antitrust, avoid costs of underenforcement, and
have benefits as markets change because courts could respond accordingly
to claims of anticompetitive behavior. The Supreme Court's recent ruling in
Twombly,'" holding that plaintiffs must plead antitrust claims with heightened specificity or face dismissal, will likely mitigate the kinds of linedrawing hazards for regulated industries that the Court indentified in Credit
Suisse and will reduce the likelihood of false positives that concerned to the
Court in Trinko.9 7
Alternatively, Congress could compensate for the gap that Trinko and
Credit Suisse created by exempting the FTC and DOJ from those rulings,
thereby at least preserving more flexible public antitrust enforcement in regulated industries. Congress could also reduce the potential consequences of
the Court's rulings by expressly giving regulatory agencies antitrust-like
authority to make case-by-case determinations about allegedly anticompeti195.

See Credit Suisse Sec. (USA) L.L.C. v. Billing, 551 U.S. 264, 284-85 (2007).

196.

Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007).

197. While more stringent pleading standards might help, they will also potentially defeat
meritorious cases in which the facts necessary for heightened pleading are beyond the plaintiff's
reach. Such an approach risks converting motions to dismiss into summary judgment proceedings
before the plaintiff has even had a chance for discovery. See Richard A. Epstein, Bell Atlantic v.
Twombly: How Motions to Dismiss become (Disguised) Summary Judgments, (Univ. Chi. L. &
Econ., Olin Online Working Paper No. 403, 2008), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=l 126359#.
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tive conduct even in the absence of a formal rulemaking proceeding. Such
an approach is not without cost, as agencies will likely have to undertake an
increased amount of adjudication. Increasing the ability of regulatory agencies to intervene ex post to resolve competition concerns on a case-by-case
basis rather than ex ante through a broadly applicable rule could nonetheless
help to bridge the antitrust gap that arises as regulated industries shift to
more competitive structures and conventional regulation becomes less beneficial and more costly.
The Supreme Court's trend in adopting blunt forms of claim preclusion
in regulated industries throws out good cases along with the bad, treats
private cases identically to those brought by public enforcement agencies,
and makes no provision for the comparative advantages of antitrust and
regulation in different settings. Whether through the above or some other
approaches, the gap in competition enforcement and reduction in regulatory flexibility the Court has created warrants policy attention. Courts,
Congress, and the antitrust agencies should work to restore the balance
between antitrust and regulation while mitigating the kinds of enforcement
costs that have motivated the Supreme Court to reconfigure that relationship so strongly against antitrust.
CONCLUSION

As the law stands today, antitrust will play a diminished role in regulated industries compared to that which it played before 2004. The
Supreme Court's decisions in Trinko and Credit Suisse interpreted the implicit immunizing effect of regulation broadly and read express savings
clauses narrowly. This is a change from the past, when the Court disfavored immunity and antitrust often worked as a constructive complement
to regulation in the absence of any express statutory savings provision.
This change by the Court is particularly striking given that Congress has
gone in precisely the opposite direction, adding an antitrust savings clause
to the Communications Act through the 1996 amendments that goes beyond the express but general savings clauses of the securities acts.
The Court's rationale for its recent decisions hinges on its view of the
costs of antitrust, particularly the costs of false positives in enforcement.
Concern for false positives in antitrust cases is warranted, but it can be
taken too far. Neither the evidence from previous antitrust actions in
regulated industries nor the antitrust caselaw more generally provides a
basis for such disproportionate avoidance of false positives compared to
false negatives or for the Court's implicit presumption that regulation will
be more efficient than antitrust enforcement. As this Article has argued,
the latter presumption is especially inappropriate in several major
industries subject to economic regulation. In important sectors like
telecommunications and energy, the traditional monopoly structure is
giving way to competition in the face of technological change and shifting
consumer demand. Antitrust law can play a supporting role that allows
regulators to retreat from increasingly inefficient and costly forms of
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competitive oversight in favor of more targeted antitrust enforcement.
Trinko and Credit Suisse weakened that important relationship between
antitrust and regulation. Until the balance is restored, regulators will face
difficult choices between overregulation and underregulation, with
consequences potentially far more costly than those that would have arisen
from errors in antitrust enforcement in the regulated markets at issue.

